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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Do state renewable portfolio standards (“RPSs”) signify a regulatory 
“race to the top”?  Numerous observers have suggested as much.  Most 
prominently, Professor Barry Rabe wrote in 2006, “[S]tates over time 
have increasingly tended to elevate the bar for the amount of electricity 
required by an RPS. . . .  In many respects, this resembles a multistate 
‘race-to-the-top,’ whereby many states are committing to future renewable 
energy levels that seemed inconceivable a half-decade ago.”1  Professor 
Lesley McAllister likewise has observed: “In climate policy, there seem 
to be indications of a race to the top.  States have, for example, progressively 
increased the amount of electricity that must be generated by renewable 
sources under state ‘renewable portfolio standards.’”2  David Adelman 
and Kirsten Engel also highlighted the trend, denominating RPSs as 
“arguably the most popular program” today “for promoting low-GHG 
electrical generation capacity.”3 
These scholars are not alone.  Indeed, more than one commentator has 
placed state RPSs—laws that force electric utilities to provide a portion 
 
 1. BARRY G. RABE, PEW CTR. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, RACE TO THE TOP: THE 
EXPANDING ROLE OF U.S. STATE RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS 7 (2006), available 
at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/RPSReportFinal.pdf. 
 2. Lesley K. McAllister, Regional Climate Regulation: From State Competition to 
State Collaboration, 1 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 81, 86 (2009). 
 3. David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Reorienting State Climate Change 
Policies to Induce Technological Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 835, 866 (2008); see also, e.g., 
Robert J. Michaels, National Renewable Portfolio Standard: Smart Policy or Misguided 
Gesture?, 29 ENERGY L.J. 79, 108 (2008) (“[C]ompetition among the states may improve 
regulation as they learn from each others’ successes and failures. . . .  Some renewables 
advocates view the evolution of state RPS programs as evidence of a ‘race to the top,’ 
fostering innovations that facilitate efficiency and growth.”); Ronald H. Rosenberg, 
Harmonious Federalism in Support of National Energy Goals—Increased Wind 
Renewable Energy, 85 N.D. L. REV. 781, 813 (2009) (“During the last decade, these 
[renewable portfolio] standards have spread across the United States as states increasingly 
adopted these policies under their general authority to regulate electrical utilities operating 
within their borders.  In some states, these policies have evolved into second generation 
standards with more ambitious renewable energy percentages and target achievement 
dates.”). 
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of their energy from renewable resources—squarely within the wave of 
state, local, and regional action on climate change that has well surpassed the 
federal government’s persistent foot-dragging on the subject.  As Vicki 
Arroyo and Vivian Thomson recently noted, “When it comes to fixing the 
broken politics of global warming in the United States, all eyes tend to 
focus on the global stage.  However, the path to a national policy has 
already been paved, by the thirty-five states that have filled the void left 
by federal inaction.”4 
There is good reason to think that state RPSs constitute a race to the top.  
State climate change initiatives, including RPSs, provide some of the most 
fertile ground in recent memory for finding such regulatory races 
upward—the situation that occurs when states begin adopting more and 
more aggressive laws in order to compete with each other for industry, 
jobs, and business.5  RPSs exploded onto the scene in the last two 
 
 4. Vivian E. Thomson & Vicki Arroyo, Upside-Down Cooperative Federalism: 
Climate Change Policymaking and the States, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 1 (2011); see also, 
e.g., David J. Hurlbut, Multistate Decision Making for Renewable Energy and 
Transmission: An Overview, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 677, 681 (2010) (“Some scholars argue 
that, by several important benchmarks, states have done a better job of solving renewable 
energy policy puzzles than has the federal government.  Congressional efforts to establish 
a federal renewable portfolio standard . . . have failed repeatedly since the late 1990s.”); 
Roberta F. Mann, Federal, State, and Local Tax Policies for Climate Change: 
Coordination or Cross-Purpose?, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 369, 376 (2011) (“Founding 
Father James Madison contemplated that state and local action could be used by the federal 
government as a policy incubator . . . .  Operating in the vacuum left by federal inaction, 
state and local governments have taken a number of different policy approaches to climate 
change mitigation. . . .  Twenty-five states have renewable portfolio standards . . . .”); 
Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. & Marie Bradshaw Durrant, State and Regional Control of 
Geological Carbon Sequestration (Part I), 41 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10348, 
10367 (2011) (“[F]ailure of the federal government to develop a sustainable electrical 
energy policy has led to state efforts that encourage and discourage the use of fossil fuel 
to generate electricity.  States have created renewable portfolio standards . . . .”); 
Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 813–14 (“These state renewable energy policies have become 
increasingly common, having been adopted in approximately 60% of the states.  
Interestingly, this has been accomplished independently without federal direction or 
support.”); Patricia E. Salkin, New York Climate Change Report Card: Improvement 
Needed for More Effective Leadership and Overall Coordination with Local Government, 
80 U. COLO. L. REV. 921, 922 (2010) (“During the past decade, while the federal 
government dragged its feet on the issue of global warming, many state and local 
governments have been stepping up to take a leadership role . . . . [including by adopting] 
renewable portfolio standards . . . .”). 
 5. See generally, e.g., Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to 
Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions  in 
Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 67, 80–87 (1996) (discussing the 
circumstances in which a beneficial race-to-the-top are more or less likely). 
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decades.  In 1993, only one state, Iowa, had an RPS.6  By 2000, that total 
had increased to twelve RPS states.7  Today, the tally is thirty-seven states 
plus the District of Columbia, a truly remarkable transformation of the 
nation’s renewable energy legal landscape.8 
That these laws must put some additional pressure on renewable energy 
deployment is plain.9  To the extent one views a higher level of renewables 
 
 6. There is some ambiguity surrounding when Iowa’s RPS took effect, or rather, 
when it actually became an RPS.  A number of commentators have pointed to Iowa as 
adopting the first RPS in the early 1980s.  See, e.g., Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: 
The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1339, 1357 (2010); Rosenberg, supra 
note 3, at 812; Ernest E. Smith & Becky H. Diffen, Winds of Change: The Creation of 
Wind Law, 5 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 165, 173 (2009); Benjamin K. Sovacool & 
Christopher Cooper, The Hidden Costs of State Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), 15 
BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 3 (2007); cf. Gary C. Bryner, Challenges in Developing a Diverse 
Domestic Energy Portfolio: Integrating Energy and Climate Policy in the Western United 
States, 15 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 73, 107 (2007) (“Iowa was the first state to create an RPS, 
setting a goal in 1991 of requiring power companies to produce 105 MW of renewable 
power.”); Reitze, Jr. & Durrant, supra note 4, at 10368 (“Iowa, in 1991, was the first state 
to enact an RPS.”).  However, the 1983 law merely gave Iowa’s public utilities board the 
authority to order utilities to purchase renewables.  IOWA CODE §§ 476.36–.37 (1983).  It 
was not until an April 1992 enactment that the state legislature put in place what might be 
termed an RPS “target” of 105 MW.  See IOWA CODE § 476.43(2)(a) (1993).  However, 
this “target” was somewhat anomalous for an RPS.  It was neither a goal nor a mandate 
per se, but rather, an express limit on the amount of renewables the board could order 
utilities to acquire.  Id. (“An electric utility subject to this division . . . shall not be required 
to own or purchase, at any one time, more than its share of one hundred five megawatts of 
power [under this statute].”); cf. Alexandra B. Klass, Property Rights on the New Frontier: 
Climate Change, Natural Resource Development, and Renewable Energy, 38 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 63, 105 (2011) (suggesting that Iowa does not have an RPS); Brent Stahl, Wind 
Energy Laws and Incentives: A Survey of Selected State Rules, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 99, 108 
(2009) (same).  Iowa’s subsequent administrative action under this statute was challenged 
as unlawful, and struck down in part as preempted by PURPA.  Midwest Power Systems, 
Inc., 78 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,067 (1997); see also Iowa Power and Light Co. v. Iowa State 
Commerce Comm’n, 410 N.W.2d 236 (Iowa 1987) (upholding the law).  According to one 
Iowa official, it was only after these legal challenges that the state agency reinterpreted the 
law as an RPS.  Email from John Pearce, Utility Specialist, Iowa Utilities Board, to Mark 
Thornton, Research Assistant to Lincoln Davies, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University 
of Utah (Mar. 31, 2011) (stating that the Iowa Utilities Board “re-interpreted the AEP 
statute as an RPS requirement of 105 MW” in 1997).  Nevertheless, because both the 
board’s authority to order renewables purchases and the 105 MW limit that remains in 
effect today were in place in 1993, this article treats that as the first operative date of 
Iowa’s RPS. 
 7. See infra Part V.B.1.  Depending on how the statutes are counted, some would 
say there were eight state RPSs in 2000.  See RABE, supra note 1, at tbl.1. 
 8. See RPS Policies, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & 
EFFICIENCY (Jan. 2012), http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/summarymaps/RPS_map. 
pptx.  DSIRE and some scholars differentiate between mandatory RPSs and voluntary 
statutes that set renewable energy “goals,” implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) counting 
only the former as true RPSs.  Because, however, I consider a law’s compulsoriness to be 
merely one of many possible design features of an RPS, rather than a prerequisite to be 
counted as one, I include state statutes that set renewable energy goals as RPSs. 
 9. See, e.g., Haitao Yin & Nicholas Powers, Do State Renewable Portfolio 
Standards Promote In-State Renewable Generation?, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 1140, 1149 
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on the grid as desirable, this pressure is a good thing—a kind of 
socially beneficial “upward” force, a race to the top.  Still, the mere rush 
to legislation may or may not be indicative of a regulatory race.  Races to 
the top, like their counterpart races to the bottom,10 have distinct defining 
 
(2009); see also RYAN WISER & GALEN BARBOSE, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., 
RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2008), available at 
http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/reports/lbnl-154e-revised.pdf (calling RPSs “one of the most 
important drivers of renewable energy capacity additions” in the United States). 
 10. The environmental law literature on races to the bottom, and federalism in 
environmental regulation more generally, is immense.  See generally, e.g., DENISE 
SCHEBERLE, FEDERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1997) (discussing how state and 
federal actors’ perceptions of each other shape how environmental laws are formulated 
and implemented); DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON 
(2005) (advocating in favor of local control over environmental regulation); Henry N. 
Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for 
Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23 (1996) 
(presenting arguments in favor of some measure of decentralization in the environmental 
governance arena); Engel, State Environmental Standard Setting, supra note † 
(investigating states’ behavior with regard to the imposition of  environmental laws and 
regulations); Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1495 (1999) (seeking to reframe the environmental governance debate by looking 
beyond a state versus federal dichotomy); Jason Scott Johnston, The Tragedy of 
Centralization: The Political Economics of American Natural Resource Federalism, 74 
U. COLO. L. REV. 487 (2003) (explaining selected historical episodes and particular strands 
of Supreme Court jurisprudence by looking to the role centralization has played); David 
L. Markell, States as Innovators: It’s Time for a New Look to Our “Laboratories of 
Democracy” in the Effort to Improve Our Approach to Environmental Regulation, 58 ALB. 
L. REV. 347 (1994) (arguing heightened attention to state innovations in the realm of 
environmental regulation will lead to more successful federal efforts); Robert V. Percival, 
Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 
1141 (1995) (investigating relationships between state and federal governments, and what 
part they should play in successful environmental governance); Richard L. Revesz, The 
Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 
MINN. L. REV. 535 (1997) (arguing in favor of state control in the realm of environmental 
governance); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the 
“Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1210 (1992) (attempting to debunk the idea that state control over environmental 
governance leads to a race to the bottom); Scott R. Saleska & Kirsten H. Engel, “Facts 
Are Stubborn Things”: An Empirical Reality Check in the Theoretical Debate over the 
Race-to-the-Bottom in State Environmental Standard-Setting, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 55 (1998) (engaging with the race-to-the-bottom debate using a fact-based, rather 
than theoretical, approach); Joshua D. Sarnoff, A Reply to Professor Revesz’s Response in 
“The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Legislation,” 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y F. 295 (1998) (arguing in favor of federal controls); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids 
of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National 
Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977) (considering obstacles to successful 
implementation of environment-related federal mandates); Swire, supra note 5 
(considering the existence, or lack thereof, of a race to the bottom among states). 
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characteristics.  They are comprised of two parts: (1) state competition that 
yields more and more ambitious laws, a “race to strictness” or a “race to 
stringency,” and (2) a positive or negative impact on society from that 
race to stringency, prompting either a “race to desirability” or “race to 
undesirability.”11 
It is generally assumed that races to the top are to stringency and 
desirability, but this is not necessarily the case.  They can be to stringency 
and undesirability as well.  The type of race matters.  A race to the top 
that trends to undesirability presents a case for federal intervention in the 
form of a preemptive maximum or ceiling, whereas a race to the top that 
pushes to desirability does not create that need.  It means that state-by-
state regulation is sufficient—states are solving the regulatory problem 
without federal (depending on one’s view) intervention , interference, 
or help. 
In the case of RPSs, the presumption that state statutes reflect a race to 
both stringency and desirability makes some sense.  More and more states are 
adopting these laws.  Renewable electricity long has been touted as a 
social good.  Moreover, the legislative histories of state RPSs are littered 
with unabashed overtures from local governments attempting to use RPSs 
to attract renewable energy industry and jobs to their states.12 
This article questions this presumption.  It asks whether state RPSs really 
constitute a race to the top and, if so, what kind.  Examining a variety of 
evidence on RPS stringency, the article concludes that contrary to 
conventional wisdom, state RPSs are not a race to the top because they 
are not a race to stringency.  While far more states have RPSs today than 
twenty years ago, and while many of these RPSs are more aggressive than 
their predecessors, three trends point against the presence of a regulatory 
race to the top in state RPSs. 
First, a substantial minority of states remain on the sidelines.13  There 
are many reasons why a state might choose not to adopt an RPS.  Given, 
however, the possibility of passing a law that sends a positive signal to 
renewable energy developers but that would impose minimal or moderate 
costs on in-state consumers, the reluctance of many states to even enter 
the RPS fray militates against the conclusion that there is a race to the 
top.14 
Second, those states that have adopted RPSs have not done so in a 
manner consistent with race-to-the-top theory.15  If there were a race to 
 
 11. Swire, supra note 5, at 70. 
 12. See infra Part II.C. 
 13. See infra Part V.B.1. 
 14. See infra Parts V.A, V.B.1. 
 15. See infra Part V.B.2–.6. 
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the top, one would expect to see a dominant strategy16 of more and more 
aggressive RPSs that every—or almost every—state would adopt to attract 
industry to their state.  The data show that this is not the case.  Rather than 
converging on increased stringency, the prevailing tendency in RPSs 
is policy diversity. 
Third, the way in which states have adopted RPSs is inconsistent with 
what energy developers crave: consistency and predictability.17  Thus, what 
should be expected if there were an RPS race to the top would be statutes that, 
to the extent they change over time, do not dilute their signals seeking to 
attract industry to the enacting state.  Instead, a distinct minority of state RPSs 
have become facially weaker, not stronger, when they are amended from 
their original versions. 
This lack of an RPS regulatory race has several important  policy 
implications.  Most critically, it means that room remains for federal action 
on renewables: If the nation would benefit from additional renewable 
electricity, states have not solved that problem yet.  Moreover, if states 
are not racing to stringency, there should not be a need for a federal 
ceiling on renewables, as might be the case if there were a race to the top.  
Finally, the divergence in how states adopt RPSs provides further evidence 
that something other than renewables promotion is bound up in these laws.  
States appear to be using RPSs for possible posturing and symbolism, 
which itself might argue for a national renewable energy requirement. 
This article proceeds in six parts.  Part II offers a primer on RPSs, 
describing RPSs’ primary traits, how the laws are designed, why they are 
enacted, and how that relates to regulatory races.  Part III overviews the 
literature on regulatory races, contrasting races to the bottom with races 
to the top.  Part IV conceptualizes how state enactments of RPSs might be 
viewed as a race to the top.  Part V examines evidence on whether RPSs can 
in fact be understood as a regulatory race.  Using this evidence, Part V 
determines that state RPSs do not appear to be trending toward generally 
more stringent laws, and then briefly assesses the implications of that finding.  
 
 16. In game theory parlance, a dominant strategy is also referred to as a dominated 
strategy or a Nash equilibrium.  Broadly, a Nash equilibrium is “a profile of strategies such 
that each player’s strategy is an optimal response to the other players’ strategies.”  DREW 
FUNDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 11 (1991).  The problem with the prisoner’s 
dilemma is that its Nash equilibrium leads to results that are suboptimal for both parties 
participating in the game.  See id. at 9–10.  There are, of course, many versions of strategic 
games.  See generally id. 
 17. See infra Part V.B.2–.6. 
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Perhaps most important, the lack of an RPS race to the top leaves room for 
federal action on renewable energy.  Part VI concludes. 
II.  RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS 
The RPS is at once a new phenomenon and a historical outgrowth.  The 
RPS’s dominance as the preferred way to promote renewable electricity 
in the United States became clear only in the last decade.18  States, however, 
have used RPSs since at least the early 1990s.19  The RPS, moreover, has 
its conceptual roots in other longstanding regulatory instruments.  The 
RPS is effectively the reverse of the “cap and trade” legislation that has 
been proposed in the United States to battle climate change,20 legislation 
that itself finds a theoretical basis in other longstanding environmental 
regulatory programs, such as the Clean Air Act’s sulfur dioxide (“SO2”), 
or “acid rain,” trading program.21  Indeed, by combining both a potentially 
inflexible regulatory directive and the malleable tool of economic trading, 
RPSs evoke both the cutting edge of modern environmental law and the 
vintage look of circa late-1960s pollution control. 
The RPS’s elegance is in its design.  Though there is truth to the 
observation that RPSs are a command-and-control type of “mandate” that 
forces electricity providers to meet a specific regulatory objective22—a 
percentage-based share of power produced from renewables—it is just as 
plain that RPSs harness markets.  Like traditional command-and-control 
 
 18. See Davies, Power Forward, supra note 6, at 1357–58.  See generally RABE, 
supra note 1; WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 9. 
 19. See IOWA CODE §§ 476.43–.44 (2011).  Some commentators have suggested that 
Iowa’s law was an RPS as early as 1983.  See supra note 6. 
 20. For an example of such legislation, see the American Clean Energy and Security 
Act of 2009, H.R. Res. 2454, 111th Cong. § 335 (2009) (also known as the “Waxman-
Markey Bill”).  See generally, e.g., Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade 
System to Address Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293 (2008) (arguing for a 
cap-and-trade approach); Stephanie L. Wilson, Note, Dog Days of Climate Change: 
Heating the Debate for Federal Cap-and-Trade, 28 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 163 
(2008) (arguing in favor of a cap-and-trade approach). 
 21. There are, of course, other pollution trading schemes in environmental law.  For 
a primer, see generally, for example, JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 104–07 (2d ed. 2007) (looking closely at attempts to 
address the problem of acid rain with trading mechanisms); E. Donald Elliott, 
Environmental Markets and Beyond: Three Modest Proposals for the Future of 
Environmental Law, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 245, 247–48, 251–54 (2001) (discussing various 
market-based approaches used to combat environmental problems); Robert W. Hahn & 
Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old 
Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1991) (describing past uses of market-based approaches, and 
considering what part such approaches might play in the future); Paul L. Joskow & Richard 
Schmalensee, The Political Economy of Market-Based Environmental Policy: The U.S. 
Acid Rain Program, 41 J.L. & ECON. 37 (1998) (looking in-depth at the acid-rain program). 
 22. Jim Rossi, Commentary, The Limits of a National Renewable Portfolio 
Standard, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1425, 1428 (2010). 
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regulation, the RPS sets a firm goal that companies subject to the law must 
meet.23  In this way, RPSs are reminiscent of traditional pollution control 
standards that, for instance, dictate that every sludge incineration plant 
“shall not exceed 3.2 kg (7.1 lb) of mercury [emissions] per 24-hour 
period.”24  Also, like newer market-based environmental regulatory 
regimes, many RPSs allow satisfaction of their mandates through the 
acquisition of renewable energy credits, or “RECs,” which typically 
represent the production of one megawatt hour (“MWh”) of renewables-
fueled electricity.25  Because RECs can be sold on the open market like a 
commodity, utilities in states with this type of RPS theoretically could 
comply with their mandates solely by purchasing RECs and never producing 
a single additional kilowatt-hour (“kWh”) of renewable electricity.  This 
is directly analogous to other market-based forms of environmental 
regulation that permit one polluting business to achieve compliance not 
by reducing its own waste, but rather, by paying another polluter to trim 
more than its own share.26  Like these market-based rules, RECs inject an 
element of economic efficiency into RPS schemes.  Where it is cheaper for a 
utility to buy power from someone else rather than expending capital to 
put its own steel in the ground, RECs expressly endorse that choice: The RPS 
mandates a renewable goal, but it uses markets to get there.27 
There are, of course, other ways to promote renewables.  Typologically, 
these historically fall into four categories: (1) mandates, including RPSs; 
(2) cost recovery guarantees and purchase requirements, such as those 
used for “qualifying facilities” under PURPA or, more recently, “feed-in 
tariffs”;28 (3) subsidies and other tax benefits, such as wind production tax 
credits;29 and (4) research and development funding.  The United States has 
 
 23. Davies, Power Forward, supra note 6, at 1359. 
 24. 40 C.F.R. § 61.52(b) (2010). 
 25. Karlynn S. Cory & Blair G. Swezey, Renewable Portfolio Standards in the 
States: Balancing Goals and Rules, ELECTRICITY J., May 2007, at 21, 22.  See generally 
Seth D. Hilton & Chad T. Marriott, Tradable Renewable Energy Credits in California: 
The Struggle with Implementation, ELECTRICITY J., July 2010, at 65 (describing 
specifically a California attempt at using RECs); Pallab Mozumder & Achla Marathe, 
Gains from an Integrated Market for Tradable Renewable Energy Credits, 49 
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 259 (2004) (discussing the role RECs can play in an RPS 
framework). 
 26. Davies, Power Forward, supra note 6, at 1359–60, 1392–93. 
 27. Id. at 1393. 
 28. Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 210(a) –
(b), 92 Stat. 3117, 3119 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2645). 
 29. See generally, e.g., Mona Hymel, The United States’ Experience with Energy-
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a long tradition of providing research and development funding for both 
renewable and more conventional forms of energy.30  In Europe, the more 
novel instrument of the feed-in tariff, or “FIT,” has dominated,31 though 
equivalents of the RPS also have played a role in some countries32—and the 
FIT is beginning to make some headway here.33 
Given the RPS’s dominance domestically, and the FIT’s prevalence 
abroad, the debate over how to promote renewables increasingly is cast as 
a binary choice between these two measures.  This is true despite the fact 
that the two tools can be implemented complementarily,34 and that both 
try to do the same thing: Renewables promotion is, at bottom, about 
changing our energy landscape—about trying to meld energy, economic, 
and environmental independence, security, and sustainability in a way that 
we do not today.  Regardless of whether another tool might be more 
efficient, or effective, at doing this, so far the United States has  
overwhelmingly chosen the RPS.  The question of whether there is a race 
to the top in renewables in the United States, then, is a question about 
whether there is a race to the top in RPSs. 
A.  The RPS 
Conceptually, RPSs are straightforward.  They are mandates for electric 
 
Based Tax Incentives: The Evidence Supporting Tax Incentives for Renewable Energy, 38 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 43 (2006) (considering how tax incentives might best be used to 
encourage the use of renewable); James W. Moeller, Of Credits and Quotas: Federal Tax 
Incentives for Renewable Resources, State Renewable Portfolio Standards, and the 
Evolution of Proposals for a Federal Renewable Portfolio Standard, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL. 
L. REV. 69, 72–97 (2004) (surveying various past tax incentive programs). 
 30. Looking at the data, one might note that this funding has skewed heavily toward 
fossil fuels, nuclear power, and other conventional energy technologies.  See Lincoln L. 
Davies, Essay, Energy Policy Today and Tomorrow—Toward Sustainability?, 29 J. LAND 
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 71, 79–80 fig.3 (2009). 
 31. Pierre Bull et al., Designing Feed-in Tariff Policies to Scale Clean Distributed 
Generation in the U.S., ELECTRICITY J., Apr. 2011, at 52, 52–53 (“All told, as of 2009, 
more than 50 countries were experimenting with, or fully implementing FITs . . . .”); see 
also Wilson H. Rickerson et al., If the Shoe FITs: Using Feed-In Tariffs to Meet U.S. 
Renewable Electricity Targets, ELECTRICITY J., May 2007, at 73, 73–74.  For an excellent 
deconstruction of feed-in tariff design, see Toby Couture & Yves Gagnon, An Analysis of 
Feed-in Tariff Remuneration Models: Implications for Renewable Energy Investment, 38 
ENERGY POL’Y 955 (2010). 
 32. Marc Ringel, Fostering the Use of Renewable Energies in the European Union: 
The Race Between Feed-in Tariffs and Green Certificates, 31 RENEWABLE ENERGY 1, 8–
10 (2006). 
 33. For a discussion of various state FIT policies, see generally Jim Rossi, Clean 
Energy and the Price Preemption Ceiling, 3 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 247 
(2012). 
 34. Rickerson et al., supra note 31, at 83–84; KARLYNN CORY ET AL., FEED-IN TARIFF 
POLICY: DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION, AND RPS POLICY INTERACTIONS 9–11 (2009), 
available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy09osti/45549.pdf. 
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power providers—known in regulatory speak as “load-serving entities” 
(“LSEs”)35—to ensure that a portion of the electrons they deliver to 
consumers are “green,” or come from renewable resources.  That is, RPSs are 
exactly what they sound like.  They are requirements that a portion of the 
provider’s electric generation portfolio is renewable, rather than fossil- or 
nuclear-powered. 
A simple RPS thus could be written in one or two sentences.  It need 
merely state that there is a percentage requirement of renewables that must 
or should be used in providing electricity, and that electric suppliers are 
subject to the law.  Theoretically, nothing more need be said.  Because 
RPSs count on utilities to acquire whatever renewables they will use, 
the law needs only to define what is renewable.  It does not need to set 
a price for compliance, establish a preference for any certain type of 
renewable resource, or mandate what the terms of the RPS contract will be.36  
Indeed, some state RPSs are almost this plain.  Montana, for instance, has 
an RPS whose chief operative provision simply declares: 
In each compliance year beginning January 1, 2010, through December 31, 2014, 
each public utility and competitive electricity supplier shall procure a minimum 
of 10% of its retail sales of electrical energy in Montana from eligible renewable 
resources.37 
Rhode Island’s RPS directive is likewise straightforward.  “Starting in 
compliance year 2007,” it reads, “all obligated entities shall  obtain at 
least three percent (3%) of the electricity they sell at retail to Rhode Island 
end-use customers, adjusted for electric line losses, from eligible 
renewable energy resources, escalating, according to the following 
schedule.”38 
Of course, RPSs need not be so plain.  Even a few touchstones from 
Maryland’s and Washington’s statutes expose the possible complexity of 
RPSs.  One uses a 20 percent target,39 while the other sets its sights at 15 
 
 35. Load-serving entities earned that moniker because they sell electric power to 
retail consumers and other end users, or the electric system’s engineering “load.” 
 36. Cf. NANCY RADER & SCOTT HEMPLING, THE RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARD: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE 1–3 (2001), available at http://www.naruc.affiniscape.com/ 
associations/1773/files/rps.pdf (describing the ways the “market-based nature of the RPS” 
enhance efficiency). 
 37. MONT. CODE ANN. § 69-3-2004(3)(a) (2010) (amended 2011). 
 38. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-26-4(a) (2011). 
 39. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. § 7-703(b)(17) (2011) (amended 2011). 
DAVIES - FINAL AUTHOR EDITS ACCEPTED (2) (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/11/2016  9:34 AM 
 
14 
percent.40  One applies to “all retail electricity sales in the State by 
electricity suppliers,”41 while the other brings only those “qualifying” 
utilities that “serve[] more than twenty-five thousand customers in the 
state” within its grasp.42  One wants compliance with its mandate by 2022,43 
the other by 2020.44  One counts “solar,” “wind,” “qualifying biomass,” 
“geothermal,” “ocean,” “small hydroelectric,” and “methane from the 
anaerobic decomposition of organic materials in a landfill or wastewater 
treatment plant” as eligible renewable resources,45 whereas the other lifts 
the restriction on hydroelectric, adds qualifications to what is eligible 
biodiesel, and puts a very specific, old growth forest-oriented spin on 
biomass.46  Continue further, and the list of possible ways to design an 
RPS becomes almost dizzying.47 
Backing away from the details, there are at least four axes along which 
states can design their RPSs.  The first is the target percentage.  Does a 
state, like California, want a full third48 of its electricity to come from 
renewables?  Or is it more like North Carolina, which seeks only 12.5 
percent?49 
The second parameter is how quickly the state wants to get to its target.  
Does the state seek a rapid sea change in its electricity profile, such as 
Oklahoma’s aspiration to achieve compliance with its RPS by 2015?50  Or 
is the transition it seeks more gradual, such as Hawaii’s target date of 
2030?51 
The third question any RPS must answer is to whom the law applies.  
Does the RPS include all three of the main types of electric suppliers—
investor-owned utilities (“IOUs”), cooperatives, and municipalities—
such as Utah’s law does?52  Or are only the large, incumbent IOUs subject to 
the RPS, such as in Iowa?53 
 
 40. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.040(2)(a)(iii) (2011). 
 41. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. § 7-703(a)(1)(i) (2011). 
 42. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.030(16) (2011); see id. § 19.285.040(2)(a). 
 43. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. § 7-703(b)(17) (2011). 
 44. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.040(2)(a)(iii) (2011). 
 45. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. § 7-701(l) (2011). 
 46. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285.030(18) (2011). 
 47. See generally RADER & HEMPLING, supra note 36 (detailing dozens of policy 
design questions for RPSs). 
 48. 2011 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1st Ex. Sess. Ch. 1 (S.B. 2) (West), amending CAL. PUB. 
UTIL. § 399.15(b)(2)(B) (2011). 
 49. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133.8(b) (2011) (amended 2011). 
 50. OKLA. STAT. tit. 17, § 801.4(B) (2011). 
 51. HAW. REV. STAT. § 269-92(4) (2010).  California and Hawaii have two of the 
most aggressive percentage targets; Hawaii’s is 40 percent.  Id. 
 52. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-19-201, 54-2-1(7), 54-17-602(1)(a) (West 2011). 
 53. IOWA CODE § 476.42 (2011). 
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Finally, there is the question of what resources count as renewable.  
Does every flavor of renewable resource count, including not just wind, 
solar photovoltaics, and geothermal, but also solar thermal, biomass, 
hydroelectricity, and tidal, such as in North Carolina?54  Or is the law 
more restrictive, such as Illinois’s RPS, which excludes  ocean and 
geothermal resources?55  Or is its view of eligibility shaped by broader 
notions of “clean,” “green,” “advanced,” or “carbon lite” power, such that it 
counts not just renewables but also nuclear, clean coal technologies like 
carbon capture and sequestration, and efficiency and energy conservation?56 
 
 54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133.8(a)(8) (2011) (amended 2011). 
 55. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 3855/1-10, 1-75(c) (2008) (amended 2011). 
 56. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4928.01(A)(34), 4928.64(A)–(B) (LexisNexis 
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Even within these four metes and bounds, the myriad possibilities for 
RPS design should be obvious.  This is perhaps why guides on RPS design 
are so voluminous.57  Once one moves past theory, moreover, the message 
becomes even clearer.  The sheer diversity of measures that states have 
actually adopted is staggering.58 
B.  RPS Design 
Most scholarship evaluating the efficacy of RPSs has ignored the 
potential design characteristics of these laws.59  Nevertheless, design 
matters.60  One hardly needs empirics to say that, in all probability, an 
RPS with a one percent total goal over three decades is less likely to make 
a meaningful change in the electricity landscape than a statute with a 
twenty percent target over ten years.  Indeed, the chief study to date to 
take RPS design into account found that how an RPS is written does affect 
performance.61  “The difference . . . is striking,” the authors wrote.62  
“[S]ome seemingly aggressive RPS policies in fact provide only weak 
incentives, while some seemingly moderate RPS policies are in fact 
relatively ambitious.”63  They thus concluded: 
  
 
2011); W. VA. CODE §§ 24-2F-3(2)–(5), (13)–(14), 24-2F-4(a)–(b), 24-2F-5 (2011). 
 57. See, e.g., RADER & HEMPLING, supra note 36. 
 58. See Davies, Power Forward, supra note 6, at 1375–81, 1385–89. 
 59. See, e.g., Sanya Carley, State Renewable Energy Electricity Policies: An 
Empirical Evaluation, 37 ENERGY POL’Y 3071, 3071, 3074 (2009) (using a binary RPS 
variable to test RPS effectiveness, despite recognizing that “[d]ifferent renewable portfolio 
standards across the country have considerable variation in policy objectives and policy 
design”); Magali A. Delmas & Maria J. Montes-Sancho, U.S. State Policies for Renewable 
Energy: Context and Effectiveness, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 2273, 2278 (2011) (using a binary 
variable for RPS presence); Fredric C. Menz & Stephan Vachon, The Effectiveness of 
Different Policy Regimes for Promoting Wind Power: Experiences from the States, 34 
ENERGY POL’Y 1786, 1790 (2006) (using a binary RPS variable). 
 60. Yin & Powers, supra note 9, at 1149. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
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[O]n average, RPS policies have had a significant and positive effect on in-state 
renewable energy development.  These results cast doubt on the argument that 
the passage of RPS policies has been purely symbolic, or that they have otherwise 
not been implemented.  These findings are masked when differences among RPS 
policies are ignored.64 
Accounting for RPS design, then, is important.  Ignoring RPS design is the 
equivalent of lumping all criminal proscriptions together, misdemeanors with 
felonies.  In assessing these laws, such coarse clustering makes little sense, 
whether it is for the purpose of measuring their effectiveness, or for 
weighing if they suggest a regulatory race. 
RPS designs can be mapped many different ways—almost as many, it 
seems, as there are RPSs themselves.65  Design metrics, however, that cut 
across RPS types to show both commonalities and differences in the laws are 
most useful, because they allow for a clearer juxtaposition of 
approaches.  In a prior article, I devised a composite “efficacy tendency” 
metric that exposed a number of similarities and divergences among state 
RPS approaches.66  While this metric is admittedly rough—only an initial 
attempt at weighing design, constructed to show where RPSs differ 
rather than to carefully rate RPS effectiveness67—it highlights a number 
of RPS features that may be useful for assessing whether there is an RPS 
race to the top. 
The “efficacy tendency” metric comprises four broad classes of RPS 
design traits, which in turn include their own sub-classes of more specific 
traits.68  The four classes attempt to capture the different ways that RPSs 
can be structured, based on reasoned assumptions about which traits should 
make the law more or less effective.  The classes are: (1) the laws’ 
“aspirational aggressiveness,” or how assertive they are in trying to get 
more renewables on the grid; (2) their “salience distortion,” or the extent 
to which the laws look strong but in fact tend toward mere symbolism; 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Compare, e.g., RADER & HEMPLING, supra note 36, at x, with WISER & BARBOSE, 
supra note 9, at 6–10, and Davies, Power Forward, supra note 6, at 1376–78. 
 66. Davies, Power Forward, supra note 6, at 1385.  For instance, virtually all states 
count what might be termed “core” renewable resources: wind, solar PV, hydropower, and 
biomass.  Id. at 1376.  Likewise, most states expect compliance within the next two 
decades, but within that period, there is a wide and inconsistent range of target dates.  Id. 
at 1385.  And while most states make their RPSs mandatory, there is a substantial minority 
of states that do not.  See infra Part V.B. 
 67. See Davies, Power Forward, supra note 6, at 1385–86. 
 68. See id. at 1385–88, apps. E & F. 
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(3) their “market definition,” or what resources, electric providers, and 
geographic areas they encompass; and (4) their “planning and enforcement 
rigor,” or the extent to which the laws have “teeth” if a jurisdictional entity 
does not comply.69 
A most careful assessment of whether state RPSs constitute a 
regulatory race would measure both the laws’ precise effectiveness in 
attracting renewable installations and their perceived strength from a 
policy design perspective.70  It would then match these trends against 
each other, and weigh what has happened over time.  In short, it would 
ask: Are state RPSs becoming more effective at attracting renewables—
or at least are they appearing to become more effective?  This would be 
an extensive undertaking, albeit a fascinating one. 
Given, however, the dazzling array of ways in which state RPSs can be 
designed, eking out perfectly calibrated state-by-state scores may not be 
necessary for assessing whether the general trajectory of the laws is 
“upward,” “downward,” or otherwise.  In this context, perhaps not all RPS 
traits matter, or perhaps some matter less than others. 
For instance, whether a state includes all renewables as eligible resources 
should, all else equal, make the law more likely to promote the growth of 
renewables-powered electricity in the state because more resource types 
are available to compete for a piece of that state’s RPS pie.  But such a 
trait might mean less when context is considered.  Iowa likely does not 
include ocean energy in its law because it does not border a sea.71  Likewise, 
some RPS measurements may be ambivalent at best when it comes to 
assessing a possible regulatory race.  A protectionist provision that 
requires a portion of RPS-qualifying power to come from in-state energy 
sources72 certainly looks like a state that is trying to use its RPS to compete 
with others to pull commerce into its borders, and thus, might be taken as 
good evidence of the existence of a regulatory race.  There are, however, 
numerous reasons why a state would not incorporate such a provision into 
its RPS, even if it viewed itself as “racing” other states.  These include, 
 
 69. See id. at 1386. 
 70. This is because not counting for RPS design masks possible effects of policy 
difference.  Calculating RPS effectiveness, moreover, may be complicated by “leakage” 
to other states: the risk that a state with an RPS will merely attract more “green electrons” 
from neighboring states that do not have RPSs, rather than actually incenting new 
renewables installations.  See Adelman & Engel, supra note 3, at 867; Rossi, Commentary, 
supra note 22, at 1431–32; see also Erwin Chemerinsky et al., California, Climate 
Change, and the Constitution, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. 10653, 10654 (2007). 
 71. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 476.42 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.). 
 72. A surprising number of state RPSs include these provisions.  See Davies, Power 
Forward, supra note 6, at 1379–81; Kirsten H. Engel, Why Not a Reasonable Approach to 
State Power Mandates?, 3 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 79, 84 (2012). 
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among others, fear of a constitutional challenge to the provision,73 worries 
about retail price changes, or the knowledge that cheap renewable imports 
are available from a neighboring state.74 
For practical purposes, then, not so nearly wide a net need be cast.  
“Efficacy tendency”-like scores might provide a good check on other 
metrics, but from the perspective of assessing whether there is an RPS 
regulatory race, some traits count more than others.  In fact, both in the 
media and on legislature floors, there are two primary RPS design factors that 
tend to draw the most attention: (1) whether the state has an RPS at all, 
and (2) how big its RPS goal is.75 
Understanding other regulatory races, this only makes sense.  One of 
the chief theories explaining why environmental law “races to the bottom” 
endure is the symbolism that regulators’ actions carry.76  Irrespective of 
whether lowering the stringency of environmental rules actually helps 
attract commerce to a state or not, the message a legislature conveys 
when it says it is making its state more business-friendly is powerful.77  
So, too, for RPSs: A state legislator who favors an RPS may gain the bulk 
of the political currency up for grabs merely by casting her vote for any 
RPS, not by being willing only to vote for a perfect measure.78  Further, 
 
 73. For analyses of possible constitutional challenges to these laws, see, for example, 
Nathan E. Endrud, Note, State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Their Continued Validity and 
Relevance in Light of the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Supremacy Clause, and 
Possible Federal Legislation, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 259, 265, 270 (2008); Patrick R. 
Jacobi, Note, Renewable Portfolio Standard Generator Applicability Requirements: 
How States Can Stop Worrying and Learn to Love the Dormant Commerce Clause, 30 VT. 
L. REV. 1079, 1103 (2006); Trevor D. Stiles, Renewable Resources and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 4 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 33, 63 (2009).  For a discussion of 
some challenges that have been lodged, see Engel, Why Not, supra note 72. 
 74. Each of these rationales has been offered as a reason not to adopt a federal RPS.  
See Davies, Power Forward, supra note 6, at 1370–75. 
 75. Cf. RABE, supra note 1, at 5–7; Cory & Swezey, supra note 25, at 21; Thomas 
P. Lyon & Haitao Yin, Why Do States Adopt Renewable Portfolio Standards?: An 
Empirical Investigation, 31 ENERGY JOURNAL 131, 132 (2010). 
 76. See Saleska & Engel, supra note 10, at 78. 
 77. See id. 
 78. There is substantial evidence that legislators voting in favor of RPSs are 
motivated by economic considerations.  See infra Part II.C; see also RABE, supra note 1, 
at 6 (“Perhaps one of the biggest factors facilitating such diverse support has been a 
commonly held perception that promotion of renewable energy through an RPS is in the 
economic interest of an individual state and thereby compatible with the predominant state 
goals of promoting economic development.”); Lisa Wood et al., RPS Patchwork Has 
Common Thread: Clean Energy Must Bring Jobs to States, ELECTRIC UTILITY WEEK, Mar. 
29, 2010, at 1, 1-2. 
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to the extent the public is weighing what the legislature is doing, the 
easiest aspect to understand in any RPS is its percentage target.79  
Consequently, a state may well use an RPS target that is aggressive on its 
face to mask other statutory traits that erode the law’s actual  
aggressiveness, or its effectiveness.80 
Indeed, as the history of RPS enactments makes clear, this appears to 
be exactly the way the public sees these laws—or, at least, how legislatures 
are trying to portray them.  While RPSs initially may have been conceived 
primarily as tools for promoting renewable energy technology, they quickly 
became much more than that.81  Today, goals cited for adopting RPSs 
routinely include not just renewable energy promotion but also jobs, 
economics, and money. 
C.  RPS Goals 
If RPSs started out as a way to promote environmentally friendly 
energy, the trend is largely a historical one.  Listen to any press conference 
on the signing of an RPS today, and it quickly becomes clear that these 
laws’ goals are increasingly lofty.  The environmental protection aim 
remains, but many others have been injected as well. 
Take Oregon Governor Ted Kulongoski’s statement on signing that 
state’s RPS into law in 2007.82  The renewables-promotion message remains 
front and center, but the other aims he cites are so optimistic it is almost 
breathtaking: 
This bill is the most significant environment legislation we [have] enact[ed] in 
more than 30 years that will also stimulate billions of dollars in investment—
creating hundreds, if not thousands, of jobs in both urban and rural Oregon . . . . 
Today we are not only setting the state on a responsible path toward 25 percent 
renewable energy by 2025, but we are protecting our quality of life, reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions, stimulating our economy—and protecting ratepayers 
with more stable and predictable utility rates.83 
 
 79. The plethora of empirical studies that attempt to weigh RPS effectiveness 
without taking policy design into account are one indication of this.  See, e.g., Carley, 
supra note 60; Magali A. Delmas & Maria J. Montes-Sancho, 39 ENERGY POLICY 2273 
(2011); Menz & Vachon, supra note 60. 
 80. Cf. Davies, Power Forward, supra note 6, at 1361, 1387. 
 81. Cory & Swezey, supra note 25, at 21 (“Initially proposed as a mechanism to 
support renewable energy development in competitively restructured electricity markets, 
the RPS model today serves additional policy aims such as fuel diversity and in-state 
economic development.”). 
 82. Press Release, Governor Ted Kulongoski, Governor Kulongoski Signs 
Renewable Portfolio Standard into Law: Legislation Sets the Goal of Achieving 25% of 
Energy from Renewable Sources by 2025 (June 6, 2007), available at http://archived 
websites.sos.state.or.us/Governor_Kulongoski_2011/governor.oregon.gov/Gov/P2007/ 
press_060607.shtml. 
 83. Id. 
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Governor Kulongoski’s statement is remarkable not just for what it says 
but also for what it represents.  The very first thing he noted was not that 
the law will pave the way to a more sustainable energy future, but that it 
will “stimulate billions of dollars in investment”—not that it has an 
aggressive 25 percent RPS target, but that it will protect Oregonians’ “quality 
of life” and “stimulat[e their] economy.”84  There is little to criticize in 
such laudable goals, but what it says about RPSs and how politicians see 
them is telling indeed. 
RPSs have become about far more than just clean electricity for clean 
electricity’s sake.  Today, these laws also are about independence, energy 
security, job growth, and climate change.85  Perhaps this was inevitable.  
Energy issues are always volatile, precisely because energy use cuts across 
so many segments of society.  That is, in part, much of why integrating 
energy law and environmental law is so difficult.86  The former is a 
battleground for every issue, and the latter seeks to make its domain the 
chief war field for what society will become.  Climate change, too, has 
come to dominate the energy-environment discourse, even in the absence of 
comprehensive federal action.87  Climate change is the great sucking sound 
in environmental law today. 
Nevertheless, while RPSs have become, almost if not  actually, 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Davies, Power Forward, supra note 6, at 1358; see also WISER & BARBOSE, 
supra note 9, at 2; Cory & Swezey, supra note 25, at 21.  For arguments that RPSs can be 
used to help address climate change, see, for instance, Davies, Power Forward, supra note 
6, at 1358; Timothy P. Duane, Greening the Grid: Implementing Climate Change Policy 
Through Energy Efficiency, Renewable Portfolio Standards, and Strategic Transmission 
System Investments, 34 VT. L. REV. 711, 748, 750 (2010); Ivan Gold & Nidhi Thakar, A 
Survey of State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Square Pegs for Round Climate Change 
Holes?, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 183, 257 (2010); Barry Rabe, Race to 
the Top: The Expanding Role of U.S. State Renewable Portfolio Standards, SUSTAINABLE 
DEV. L. & POL’Y 10, 11–13 (2007). 
 86. For commentary on the divide between environmental law and energy law, and 
the need to bridge it, see, for example, Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Fourth-Generation 
Environmental Law: Integrationist and Multimodal, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 771, 874 (2011); Davies, Power Forward, supra note 6, at 1390 –95; Lincoln L. 
Davies, Alternative Energy and the Energy-Environment Disconnect, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 
473, 504–06 (2010); Amy J. Wildermuth, Is Environmental Law a Barrier to Emerging 
Alternative Energy Sources?, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 509, 524, 528 (2010); Amy J. Wildermuth, 
The Next Step: The Integration of Energy Law and Environmental Law, 31 UTAH ENVTL. 
L. REV. 369 (2011). 
 87. An August 2, 2011 search for the terms “climate change” or “global warming” 
in the title of articles in Westlaw’s JLR database yielded 1156 results. 
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everything to everyone, the theme that has perhaps most clearly emerged 
from their adoption in the last two decades is economics.  As Barry Rabe 
has observed, “Perhaps one of the biggest factors facilitating [the very] 
diverse support [that RPSs enjoy] has been a commonly held perception 
that promotion of renewable energy through an RPS is in the economic 
interest of an individual state and thereby compatible with the predominant 
state goals of promoting economic development.”88  Cory and Swezey 
echo this view: “One key rationale for states to adopt an RPS is the benefit, 
in terms of more jobs and greater income, of renewable energy resource 
and project development.”89  The argument has been made in virtually 
every state that has adopted an RPS in the last decade.  RPSs will “create 
jobs,”90 “promote green jobs,”91 “create new jobs,”92 “offer[] important 
job creation . . . benefits,”93 “provid[e] jobs for local communities,”94 
and “have a positive impact on jobs . . . [and] an indirect positive impact 
on jobs [in the community].”95  Depending on the state, RPS proponents 
assert that adoption of these laws will lead to “hundreds” of new jobs,96 
“thousands of jobs in construction, operation and spin off industries,”97 
“billions of dollars in private investment,”98 and a “doubl[ing]” or 
“tripl[ing]” of the green energy industry within a state.99  RPSs are simply 
“great from an economic development perspective,”100 “great for the 
 
 88. RABE, supra note 1, at 6; see also RADER & HEMPLING, supra note 36, at 4–5 
(states create RPS programs because of the energy, environmental, and economic benefits 
of renewable energy). 
 89. Cory & Swezey, supra note 25, at 24. 
 90. Yee-ha! Oil State Boosts Renewables, ABERDEEN PRESS & J., Aug. 1, 2005, at 8 
(quoting Travis Brown, energy projects director for Public Citizen of Texas). 
 91. Press Release, Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Air Res. Bd., California Commits to 
More Clean, Green Energy, New Standard: 33% of Electricity from Renewable Sources 
by 2020 (Sept. 23, 2010), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/newsrel/newsrelease.php 
?id=155. 
 92. Colo. Governor Signs RPS Bill, Transmission Line Bill, GREENWIRE, Mar. 28, 
2007 (quoting Gov. Bill Ritter). 
 93. Haw. S.B. 2474 § 1 (2004), available at http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/ 
session2004/Bills/SB2474_HD2_.htm. 
 94. Jeff Tollefson, Governor’s Clean-Energy Initiative Moves Forward, SANTA FE 
NEW MEXICAN, Feb. 1, 2004, at A-1 (quoting Economic Development Secretary Rick 
Homans). 
 95. 35 N.J. REG. 4445(a) (2003). 
 96. Press Release, Governor Ted Kulongoski, supra note 82. 
 97. Press Release, Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Air Res. Bd., supra note 91. 
 98. Joe Truini, PA Renewable Standard Awaits Signature, WASTE NEWS, Dec. 6, 
2004, at 15 (quoting John Hanger, President and CEO of Citizens for Pennsylvania’s Future). 
 99. Jim Small, Arizona Corporation Commission Votes to Require Big Increase in 
Energy from Renewable Sources, AZ. CAPITOL TIMES, Nov. 3, 2006. 
 100. Sara Parker, Maryland Expands RPS: 1,500 MW Solar by 2022, RENEWABLE 
ENERGYWORLD.COM (Apr. 12, 2007), http://www.renewableenergy world.com/rea/news/ 
article/2007/04/maryland-expands-rps-1500-mw-solar-by-2022-48102 (quoting Maryland 
State Senator Rob Garagiola). 
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economy . . . , a giant step in moving [state] energy industr[ies] into the 21st 
century.”101  Some have such rosy views of RPSs that they contend the laws 
can “breathe new economic life” into society.102  The message legislators 
and other RPS advocates are trying to put out should thus be clear: RPSs 
mean a better economy, and more of it. 
Indeed, a number of states have expressly written into their RPSs the 
goal of economic benefits.  New Mexico’s law acknowledges that “the 
use of renewable energy . . . can bring significant economic benefits” to the 
state.103  Illinois likewise seeks to use its statute to “continue to be 
successful in attracting new businesses and jobs.”104  In addition, Montana’s 
RPS aims to “promote[] sustainable rural economic development,” “creat[e] 
new jobs,” and “stimulat[e] business and economic activity in local 
communities across” the state.105 
It makes sense that politicians invoke possible economic benefits in 
favor of RPSs.  Renewables have much to offer on this front.  With the need 
for more renewable electricity comes the need for more manufacturing of the 
facilities used to produce that electricity.  To the extent those  
manufacturing jobs locate in a state with the new renewables installations, 
the jurisdiction stands to benefit doubly.  In any case, numerous jobs are 
needed to install, operate, and maintain these facilities.  Add to this the 
infrastructure necessary to connect renewable installations to the grid, and 
the job gains could be substantial.  As one study found, “[w]e project that by 
2020 the 20 percent RPS would generate more than 355,000 jobs in 
manufacturing, construction, operation, maintenance, and other industries —
nearly twice as many as fossil fuels, representing a net increase of 157,480 
jobs.  Renewable energy would also provide an additional $8.2 billion in 
income and $10.2 billion in gross domestic product in the U.S. economy in 
2020.”106 
The question, then, is not whether economics has become a major 
argument used to promote RPSs, but how that argument plays out.  Does 
the growing emphasis on jobs create a situation where states are using 
 
 101. Truini, supra note 98, at 15. 
 102. Colo. Governor Signs RPS Bill, Transmission Line Bill , supra note 92 
(quoting Gov. Bill Ritter). 
 103. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-16-2(A)(2) (West 2011). 
 104. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 688/5(c) (West 2011). 
 105. MONT. CODE ANN. § 69-3-2002(2) (West 2011). 
 106. Alan Nogee et al., The Projected Impacts of a National Renewable Portfolio 
Standard, 20 ELECTRICITY J. 33, 42 (2007). 
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RPSs to race against each other to capture those economic benefits?  To 
assess that question, it is necessary first to understand more precisely what 
regulatory races are. 
III.  REGULATORY RACES 
Scholars long have posited that governments use regulation to compete for 
non-governmental goods.  The most common of these theories is the 
regulatory “race to the bottom,” which has been used to critique state-by-
state regulation in the environmental sphere, for business law, and other 
areas.107  There is, however, no shortage of regulatory race theories.  There 
also is the regulatory “race to the top,”108 and some scholars have gone so 
far as to suggest regulatory races “sideways.”109 
A.  Defining Regulatory Races 
At the heart of the regulatory race debate is economic theory.  The 
contention is that states use their power of governance—a kind of market 
currency—to compete against each other for commerce—a kind of market 
good.  The theory runs: Businesses have to locate somewhere.  States are 
that somewhere.  Normally, businesses would evaluate where they locate 
based on the inherent costs and benefits of a given location, compared to 
other options.  Because states have the power to set law within their 
 
 107. See Saleska & Engel, supra note 10; see also J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Sandeep 
Gopalan, Opting Only in: Contractarians, Waiver of Liability Provisions, and the Race to 
the Bottom, 42 IND. L. REV. 285, 305–06 (2009); Eric C. Chafee, Finishing the Race to the 
Bottom: An Argument for the Harmonization and Centralization of International 
Securities Law, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1581, 1594–95 (2010); David Crump, The Case 
for Restricting Diversity Jurisdiction: The Undeveloped Arguments, from the Race to the 
Bottom to the Substitution Effect, 62 ME. L. REV. 1, 8 (2010); Frank H. Easterbrook, The 
Race for the Bottom in Corporate Governance, 95 VA. L. REV. 685, 686–88 (2009); Daniel 
R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in 
Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913, 919–22 (1982); Timothy P. Glynn, 
Interjurisdictional Competition in Enforcing Noncompetition Agreements: Regulatory 
Risk Management and the Race to the Bottom, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1381, 1391–92 
(2008); Christopher Paul, Innovation or a Race to the Bottom? Trust “Modernization” in 
New Hampshire, 7 PIERCE L. REV. 353, 358 (2009). 
 108. See, e.g., DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 259 (1995); Gary S. Guzy, Reconciling 
Environmentalist and Industry Differences: The New Corporate Citizenship “Race to the 
Top?”, 17 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 409 (2002); Tamara L. Joseph, The Debate over 
Environmental Standards in the European Community: A Race to the Top Rather Than a 
Race to the Bottom?, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 161 (1997); Steven A. Ramirez, The End of 
Corporate Governance Law: Optimizing Regulatory Structures for a Race to the Top, 24 
YALE J. ON REG. 313 (2007); Bruce Yandle, Environmental Turning Points, Institutions, 
and the Race to the Top, 9 INDEP. REV. 211 (2004). 
 109. Eleanor M. Fox, Essay, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up, Down, 
and Sideways, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1781 (2000). 
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borders, however, they can put a thumb on the scale.  They can offer 
subsidies and tax benefits, or lower transaction costs, or make regulation 
more conducive to what the business needs.  Once one state does this, 
another will do the same in order to stay competitive for getting the 
business to locate to its jurisdiction.  Then, once this competition begins, the 
race is on.  States will ratchet up the incentives they offer to beat 
competing states, their competitors will do the same, and a regulatory 
spiral—up or down—ensues.110 
One thus might think of regulatory races in antitrust terms.  The first 
step is to define the relevant markets.111  There are two: the product market 
and the geographic market.112  For regulatory races, the product market is 
for business location.  States compete for the chance to have a business locate 
in their jurisdiction.  The geographic market is national , the United 
States.113  Each state has the ability to exercise its inherent police powers 
to attempt to attract industry to its borders.  Presumably, this market 
 
 110. See, e.g., ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY 
177–79 (1994); Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition, supra note 10, at 1213–17. 
 111. When assessing an action’s effect on competition for antitrust purposes—for 
instance, in evaluating whether a proposed merger violates antitrust laws—the first step is 
to define the relevant markets.  This includes both the relevant product markets and the 
relevant geographic markets.  E.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962); 
Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Mergers & Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 8 
(2007).  The gold standard here is often considered the DOJ-FTC merger guidelines.  See 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 
(2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/0/100819hmg.pdf [hereinafter, MERGER 
GUIDELINES]. 
 112. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 111, at 7–8, 13. 
 113. Granted, states may well be competing against other nations for industry, 
especially in the modern, world-is-flat economy, but for simplicity in exposition, let us 
assume the market is merely national rather than international.  There are, moreover, some 
indications that this assumption may not be one merely of convenience.  See Engel, State 
Environmental Standard Setting, supra note †, at 321 & n.144 (“[S]tudies of the effects of 
domestic environmental regulation upon the international location of industrial firms 
generally conclude that, while pollution-intensive industries have migrated abroad, it is 
not clear that they have done so because of increasingly strict environmental 
regulations.”) (citing Adam B. Jaffe et al., Environmental Regulation and the 
Competitiveness of U.S. Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?, 33 J. ECON. 
LIT. 132, 142–48 (1995), and Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and 
International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2065–66 (1993)).  On the other hand, 
these pollution data may have less salience in the RPS context, if foreign policies favoring 
installation of renewable facilities create a higher overall comparative price for 
renewables-produced electricity.  Cf., e.g., Ringel, supra note 32, at 8–10. 
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functions well.  Though there are stiff barriers to entry,114 there are more 
participants than in many markets: fifty, plus the District of Columbia.  
There is ample transparency, because state laws are uniformly publicly 
available.  Further, information about the market is both abundant and likely 
symmetrical; a business considering locating in two different states is 
almost certain to attempt to play them against one another. 
Why regulatory races are called “to the top” or “to the bottom” should 
thus become quickly apparent.  These races are directional for a reason.  
The competition tends to drive state regulation that affects firm location 
either up or down, depending on what makes the law more advantageous 
to capture that share of the market.115  States, for instance, competing against 
each other for industry might lessen their environmental regulation over time 
to drive the price of doing business in their jurisdiction down, thereby 
better wooing industry—a “race to the bottom.”  States, conversely, 
competing for business incorporations might make their corporate laws 
more shareholder-friendly in order to gain businesses who favor shareholder 
control—a “race to the top.” 
Concerns about these regulatory races also are largely economic.  The 
primary concern is that the races make the markets function inefficiently.  For 
races to the bottom, the worry is an economically inefficient result 
because the race will drive regulation too low, resulting in regulatory 
suboptimality.  Environmental regulation, for example, will be laxer than 
it should be to maximize the public good—the most protection of the 
environment as possible at the lowest net cost.116 
This can be the case, but it is not necessarily so.  Races to the top also 
can lead to suboptimality, albeit their own version of it.  The suboptimality 
of races to the top is not the “too low” version but the “too high” variety.  
Environmental regulation, for instance, might become more stringent than 
it should be to maximize the public good, resulting in more 
environmental protection than the public actually values—that is, at too 
high a cost.117 
In the traditional view, economic optimality is presumed to be bound 
up in whether the regulatory race is “to the bottom” or “to the top.”  
Laxer regulation suggests economic suboptimality, and stricter regulation 
 
 114. In simplified economic terms, a barrier to entry is something that limits any 
firm’s ability to compete in a market.  Though all states have the constitutional authority 
to exercise their police powers to attract business, including deciding what they would like 
their state’s generation portfolio to look like, see, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State 
Energy Res. Conservation &  Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983), it is no easy feat to 
become a state in the first place.  It has, after all, been fifty-two years since Alaska and 
Hawaii were made states. 
 115. See Swire, supra note 5, at 80–82. 
 116. Id. at 72–73. 
 117. Id. at 74–76. 
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intimates optimality.  In this view, races to the bottom and the top might 
be conceptualized as in Figure 2. 
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The reality, of course, is the converse.  There is no reason why regulatory 
laxity or stringency must lead to economic optimality or suboptimality.  One 
does not necessarily imply the other.  Professor Peter Swire perhaps put this 
best.  He observed that the terms “bottom” and “top” are too vague and value-
laden.118  He suggested a more careful and analytic way of 
approaching the question—one that separates the stringency of the 
regulatory race from the regulation’s social utility: 
As a descriptive matter, competition among jurisdictions might lead to a “race to 
strictness” . . . or a “race to laxity.”  . . .  For law as for parents, neither strictness 
nor laxity is always appropriate.  The second dimension is the prescriptive one of 
whether the competition leads to a desirable result.  Even if competition leads to 
laxer standards, it may result in a “race to desirability” . . . or a “race to 
undesirability.”119 
Professor Swire’s point is plain.  The direction—the strictness or the laxity 
—of the regulatory race is not necessarily coupled with its social  
optimality—its desirability or undesirability.  A race to laxer regulation 
might yield more net benefits than the status quo, just as a race to more 
stringent regulations might reduce the net social benefits now in place.120 
When discussing regulatory races, definitional clarity is thus imperative.  It 
is not enough to say that something is a race to the bottom or a race to the 
 
 118. Id. at 74. 
 119. Id. at 70. 
 120. See id. at 74–76. 
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top; both the direction of the regulatory rigidity and the social 
consequences of that directional change must be mapped.  This is because 
there are not just two regulatory races, as the prevalence of the terms “race 
to the bottom” and “race to the top” implies.  There are at least four.  As 
Figure 3 depicts, they are: (1) a race to laxity that leads to economic 
suboptimality (the “conventional” race to the bottom); (2) a race to laxity 
that leads to economic optimality (an “unconventional” race to the 
bottom); (3) a race to stringency that leads to economic optimality (the 
“conventional” race to the top); and (4) a race to stringency that leads to 
economic suboptimality (an “unconventional” race to the top). 




















Understanding this distinction is not important just for  clarity of 
communication.  It matters because it implicates what kind of legislative 
response is appropriate.  The traditional suggestion for a race to the bottom 
is federal law that stops the race: a national minimum of environmental 
protection, for instance, that prevents states from gutting the ecosystems 
on which we rely for a quick monetary return that is economically 
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unwise.121  This is the traditional cure because the traditional assumption 
is that “races to the bottom” inherently drive to economic suboptimality.  
The traditional suggestion for a race to the top, by contrast , is to do 
nothing.  For example, states’ push to more environmental protection 
proceeds undeterred because those efforts guard the ecosystems on which 
we rely in a way that is socially beneficial.122  This is the traditional response 
because the traditional assumption is that races to the top drive inevitably 
to economic optimality. 
Once these assumptions are removed, however, the proper response 
changes.  It may be that a race to the bottom demands a national 
minimum that prevents the race—but only if the race to laxity is also a 
race to suboptimality.  If, on the other hand, that race to laxity actually 
makes the state of regulation more economically optimal, there should not 
be a federal minimum.123  There should be no federal response at all. 
The same goes for races to the top.  While it may be that the proper 
response is inaction, that is only the case if the race to stringency is one to 
optimality.  If, however, that ratcheting up of regulation’s strictness makes 
the regulatory regime less optimal, the appropriate response is the 
companion to a race-to-laxity-and-to-suboptimality: not a federal floor but 
a federal ceiling.124 
This is Professor Swire’s thesis, and it is a critical  one.  Just as we 
cannot assume that the level of regulation corresponds to a level of social 
good, we cannot assume that the direction of a race demands a single 
type of legislative response.125  The proper response of the federal 
government, if any, hinges on the race’s outcome, not just its direction.  
Depending on the calculus, federal action might be just as appropriate in 
a race to the top as it is in a race to the bottom. 
Indeed, the possibility of four types of regulatory races rather than two 
has important implications for a possible RPS race to the top.  If there is 
such a race and it leads to economic optimality, there arguably is no role 
for federal law.  But if such a race leads to suboptimality, there is an 
 
 121. See, e.g., PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S 
CORE QUESTION 8–9, 98–104 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009). 
 122. See, e.g., Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (But Only from a 
National Perspective) for Federal Environmental Protection, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
F. 225, 279, 284 n.202 (1997). 
 123. Id.; see also Swire, supra note 5, at 70; supra note 111. 
 124. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative, supra note 122, at 279, 284 n.202; Swire, 
supra note 5, at 70; see also, e.g., Michael Burger, “It’s Not Easy Being Green”: Local 
Initiatives, Preemption Problems, and the Market Participant Exception, 78 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 835, 837–38 (2010); Thomas W. Merrill, International Law, Global 
Environmentalism, and the Future of American Environmental Policy, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
485, 490 (1994). 
 125. Swire, supra note 5, at 70; see also supra note 111. 
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argument for a federal cap on renewables.  Grasping, then, how races to 
the bottom and to the top emerge helps illuminate this question. 
B.  Races to the Bottom 
The idea behind the race to the bottom is simple.  The theory is that in 
order to attract industry to their jurisdictions, states engage in a kind of 
environmental regulatory brinkmanship that results in a lowering of their 
pollution standards.126  This theory is based on at least four assumptions: 
(1) that industry has so many options to choose from in selecting sites, it 
can influence the “price” at which states offer up those sites ; (2) that 
states want the kind of industry that may result in more pollution; (3) that 
the lessening of environmental regulations will lower industry’s costs 
sufficiently that it will meaningfully affect which sites they select; and 
(4) that the lowering of environmental standards will also lower social 
welfare, such that is not just a race to laxity but also a race to 
undesirability—a true “race to the bottom.”127 Race-to-the-bottom theory 
can be challenged on each of these assumptions, and the scholarly debate 
over its validity and application is the first evidence of that.  Reams of 
paper have been consumed in assaulting and defending the race to the 
bottom as justification for federal law.128 
To explain why states would intentionally lower social welfare, classic 
race-to-the-bottom theory posits itself as a branch of the prisoner’s 
dilemma.129 In the traditional conceptualization of the prisoner’s dilemma, 
two different criminals are arrested and have knowledge of the other’s 
 
 126. E.g., Saleska & Engel, supra note 10, at 57–58; Robert R.M. Verchick, Why the 
Global Environment Needs Local Government: Lessons from the Johannesburg Summit, 
35 URB. LAW. 471, 486 (2003). 
 127. Cf., e.g., Engel, State Environmental Standard Setting, supra note †, at 311–14; 
Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition, supra note 10, at 1220–21; Saleska & 
Engel, supra note 10, at 57–58; Swire, supra note 5, at 76–79. 
 128. See supra note 10. 
 129. Engel, State Environmental Standard Setting, supra note †, at 297-98.  Early 
applications of the prisoner’s dilemma to explain the race to the bottom include, among 
others, MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 22–36, 49–52 (1965); 
James A. Brander, Economic Policy Formation in a Federal State: A Game Theoretic 
Approach, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 33, 47–49 (Richard Simeon ed., 1985); 
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244–45 (1968); 
Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competiveness, supra note 113, at 
2058–59. 
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felonious crime.130  Each felony carries a ten-year sentence.  The best 
result—the economically optimal one, from the prisoners’ perspective—
is for both prisoners to remain silent.  If they do this, the police will lack 
sufficient evidence to prosecute them for the felonies, and will have 
enough only to convict them of misdemeanors.  The misdemeanors carry 
two-year sentences.  And there is the rub.  If, rather than remaining silent, 
one of the prisoners confesses, he knows he will earn credit for his 
cooperation and be able to make a plea deal for no jail time.  This puts 
immense pressure on both prisoners to confess.  They both know that if 
they confess, they can receive the plea-deal sentence, and both are afraid 
that the other will confess and “rat” the other out.131  Of course, if both 
prisoners confess, they will both receive five-year sentences (for the 
felony, minus time for cooperation).  The setup looks like this, with the years 
in prison represented in each box: 
  
 
 130. There are many ways to define the prisoners’ dilemma, and many names for it.  
See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Rationality in Law & Economics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
293, 312 (1992) (“The prisoners’ dilemma is simply a situation in which the costs of 
bargaining or of enforcing the resulting contract are very high.”); Gregg P. Macey, 
Cooperative Institutions in Cultural Commons, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 757, 762 (2010) 
(“With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to see why the multiparty prisoner’s dilemma of 
Garrett Hardin’s ‘tragedy of the commons’ or the free riders that figure prominently in 
Olson’s logic of collective action—both examples of a thin model of rational choice in 
action—would lead to unnecessarily dire predictions: when self-interested individuals 
with stable, clear, and fixed preferences try to maximize utility along a narrow time 
horizon (often a one-shot interaction) without external influences, resources are not 
adequately cared for and public goods are underprovided.”); Carol Rose, Game Stories, 
22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 369, 378–79 (2010) (“The classic Prisoner’s Dilemma matrix 
itself could have had quite a number of different names and accompanying stories.  An 
entirely plausible name would have been ‘Deal or Steal?’, describing the very common 
problem of potential trading partners who do not know whether they can trust each  
other . . . .  This would have placed PD in the land of commerce, where it indeed has many 
applications, instead of in jail, where it has relatively few.”). 
 131. E.g., Engel, State Environmental Standard Setting, supra note †, at 301–05; see 
also FUNDENBERG & TIROLE, supra note 16, at 9–10. 
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The irony of the prisoner’s dilemma is that both prisoners end up worse 
off than if they had remained silent.  This is because each prisoner is 
rationally compelled to engage in a “dominant strategy—a course of 
action that he follows regardless of what the other individual does.”132  
The strategy is to confess.  It is dominant because each prisoner knows 
that if he remains silent but his counterpart does not, he will end up with 
the full, ten-year sentence. 
Yet the end result of following this dominant strategy is economically 
suboptimal.  It is suboptimal because “both [prisoners] would have been 
better off with another outcome.”133  Because, however, the prisoners are 
not able to cooperate, they cannot ensure the Pareto-optimal result for 
them—silence.134  Indeed, even if they are able to converse beforehand, 
both will “defect” to the dominant “confess” strategy because each knows 
there is no way to enforce an agreement to remain silent.135  The temptation 
to betray your partner in the face of the risk that he, too, will betray you 
 
 132. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition, supra note 10, at 1217–18; see 
also Kristen Engel, supra note † (defining a dominant strategy as a Nash equilibrium).  
 133. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition, supra note 10, at 1218. 
 134. Pareto-optimality “refers to allocations of resources where there is no possible 
reallocation that can improve one individual’s situation without making someone worse 
off.”  Carol Necole Brown, Taking the Takings Claim: A Policy and Economic Analysis 
of the Survival of Takings Claims After Property Transfers, 36 CONN. L. REV. 7, 59 & 
n.273 (2003) (citing DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW 
AND ECONOMICS 11–12 (1992)); see also, e.g., DANIEL R. MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENT AND 
EQUITY 6 (1981) (“When only the participants in the trade benefit or bear costs, and when 
benefits and costs are defined by the participants’ value structure, the outcome is efficient 
in the sense that no one can be made better off without another’s being made worse off.”). 
 135. Hovenkamp, supra note 130, at 312. 
  Prisoner B 
  Silence Confess 
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is just too great. 
To see how the prisoner’s dilemma applies to regulatory races, imagine 
two different states: “Island” state and a “Competitive” state.136  Both 
states are home to industry, and both have the regulatory power to enact 
environmental laws.  From there, however, they differ substantially. 
Island state does not interact with other jurisdictions.  It is self-
sufficient.  Its industry is local, and its consumption is local; everything it 
does is local.  Thus, if a new factory in Island state opens its doors, it will 
attempt to pollute.  If it can get away with this, it will be able to 
externalize the cost of that pollution onto society, thereby reducing its own 
internal costs and increasing its profit margin.137  If, however, the Island 
state wants to force this factory to bear the costs of pollution, it will not 
matter what method of regulation the government uses.  Assuming effective 
regulation, availability of information, and political action that reflects 
political will, the level of pollution reduction the government orders will 
match the value of cleaner air, water, and ecosystems that the people of 
Island state ascribe to those goods.138  For Island state, there is no need to 
weigh the costs of this pollution abatement against the risk of losing the 
factory to another state, because the factory cannot move. 
The government’s choice, however, becomes more complicated when 
other states are introduced to the mix.  Consider now the “Competitive” 
state.  This state is not an island.  It competes with other states for industry.  
For this state, the tradeoff between environmental protection and industrial 
gain is thus much keener.  In the absence of competition, Island state has 
no reason not to force the factory to internalize the social costs of its 
pollution.  Island state knows that as long as the business can make some 
money, the factory will locate there because it has nowhere else to go.  In 
the face of competition, however, forcing cost internalization brings risk, a 
risk that Competitive state must squarely face.  If Competitive state 
increases the cost of doing business within its boundaries by requiring 
pollution abatement, the factory may well relocate to a jurisdiction that 
does not impose such costs.139  The prisoner’s dilemma enters. 
The way the prisoner’s dilemma works in the context of the Competitive 
state is not the same as the dilemma’s classic setup, but  it is directly 
analogous.  The idea is that, rather than a dominant strategy of confessing, 
competitive states have a dominant strategy of lowering their regulatory 
standards.  The idea originally predominated in the corporate governance 
 
 136. This hypothetical borrows heavily from Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate 
Competition, supra note 10, at 1213–16. 
 137. See id. at 1213–14. 
 138. See id. 
 139. See id. at 1214–16. 
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literature,140 but has become even more prevalent as a justification for 
federalization of environmental law.141  Indeed, because the Competitive 
state version of this hypothetical is much closer to modern reality in the 
United States than the Island state version, this view of how states operate 
has long commanded the thinking on how to write environmental law.142 
In her classic article, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a 
“Race” and Is It “To The Bottom”?, Professor Kirsten Engel explained how 
the prisoner’s dilemma can work in the Competitive state hypothetical.  
“Assume that, by cutting its emission standard in half, one state can attract 
half of the other state’s industrial capital. . . .”143  This, Professor Engel 
noted, is the equivalent to being able to cop a plea by ratting out your 
conspirator.  The assumption is that a reduction in environmental 
protection brings a corresponding economic payoff, just as in the 
prisoner’s dilemma, where a reduction in loyalty to a co-conspirator 
yields the benefit of less jail time.  Then, once the incentive exists to drive 
each side’s dominant strategy, a dilemma ensues that leads to a lose-lose 
outcome for both sides.  Like the lure of a shorter prison sentence in the 
prisoner’s dilemma, the promise of attracting industry “will push both 
States A and B to relax their emission standards to the suboptimal 
standard.”144 
Professor Engel employed her own hypothetical to make this point 
concrete.  In her example, two states, State A and State B, each face two 
choices: regulate pollution at the level the Island state would, 90 percent, 
which is the equivalent of remaining silent in the prisoner’s dilemma, or 
 
 140. Swire, supra note 5, at 72 (“The underlying concepts were developed as New 
Jersey and Delaware relaxed many of the previous state-law restrictions on corporate 
charters.  As early as 1904, there were denunciations of the ‘tendency of state legislation’ 
to move with great speed ‘toward the lowest level of lax regulation.’”) (citations omitted); 
see also, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon 
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 697 (1974); Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers’ Discretion 
and Investors’ Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540, 549–50 (1984); 
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Modernization of Corporate Law: An Essay for Bill Cary, 37 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 187, 203–04 (1983); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder 
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 280–81 (1977). 
 141. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition, supra note 10, at 1246–47; 
Saleska  & Engel, supra note 10, at 55–56; Sarnoff, A Reply, supra note 10, at 303; 
Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?, supra note 10, at 1217–18; Swire, supra note 5, at 87. 
 142. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition, supra note 10 at 1246; Saleska 
& Engel, supra note 10, at 63–64; Swire, supra note 5, at 88–89. 
 143. Engel, State Environmental Standard Setting, supra note †, at 304. 
 144. Id. 
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cut that standard to 45 percent, which is the equivalent of confessing.145  
The comparable “jail time” tradeoffs are expressed in terms of social 
utility: the value of environmental protection plus the value of industry in 
the state.  Thus, when both states keep their emission limits at 90 percent, 
both receive $200 in net economic and environmental benefits.146  If, 
however, one state lowers its pollution standard and the other does not, 
the state that “confesses”—the state that lowers its standard—earns a net 
benefit of $265 (increased by the economic gain and reduced by the 
environmental loss), while the state that “remains silent”—the state that 
does not lower its standard from 90 percent—drops to $175 net benefits 
(reflecting economic losses but no environmental change).147  Finally, if 
both states “confess” by lowering their standards, they both reduce net 
benefit to $200 (because neither gains economically but both lose 
environmentally).148  The hypothetical looks like this: 
FIGURE 5: THE ENVIRONMENTAL PRISONER’S DILEMMA—RACING 













Notably, the result is the same as in the prisoner’s dilemma.  While both 
states would be better off if they agreed to keep their emission standards 
at 90 percent, neither will, and as a result, both end up worse off.  The 
decision is rational, but the outcome is decidedly Pareto-suboptimal.  
That is why it is a dilemma.  States do what appears to make sense, but 
making that apparently rational choice comes at a cost.  As Professor 
Engel explains, “Fearful that they will be left the ‘suckers,’ and tempted 
by the possible extra benefits of unilateral defection, both states will 
 
 145. Id. at 304–05. 
 146. Id. at 305. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 
  State B  
  
Maintain  
std. at 90% 
Relax  
std. to 45% 
State A 
Maintain 
std. at 90% 
$250, $250 $175, $265 
Relax  
std. to 45% 
$265, $175 $200, $200 
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rationally choose to ‘defect’ (unless there is a mechanism—such as a 
federal power—for imposing the optimal standard or for enforcing 
agreements between the states not to defect).”149 
Evidence of whether there is actually this kind of race to the bottom—
both to laxity and to undesirability—in environmental law is mixed.  
Professor Engel found that a “substantial minority” of actual environmental 
regulators have relaxed environmental protection in real life in an attempt to 
attract industry to their states.150  Other empirical studies have corroborated 
this conclusion,151 though some have questioned it as well.152 
Advocates of decentralized environmental control have been particularly 
vociferous in their opposition to this race-to-the-bottom theory.153  In the 
face of evidence that state relaxation of environmental standards has little 
impact on industry decisions of where to locate,154 perhaps the most 
 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 279. 
 151. See, e.g., Saleska & Engel, supra note 10, at 73–74; Neal D. Woods, Interstate 
Competition and Environmental Regulation: A Test of the Race-to-the-Bottom Thesis, 87 
SOC. SCI. Q. 174, 177 (2006); cf. David M. Konisky, Regulatory Competition and 
Environmental Enforcement: Is There a Race to the Bottom?, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 853, 869 
(2007) (finding “strong evidence of strategic interaction in state environmental regulatory 
behavior” but noting that a theory other than the race-to-the-bottom is needed to explain 
the results). 
 152. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated 
Powers”: In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 781 (1995); James 
E. Krier, On the Topology of Uniform Environmental Standards in a Federal System—
And Why it Matters, 54 MD. L. REV. 1226, 1236–37 (1995); Revesz, Rehabilitating 
Interstate Competition, supra note 10, at 1253–54; Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and 
Federal Environmental Regulation, supra note 10, at 538–40, 543–44. 
 153. E.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental 
Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 134–35 (2005); Butler & Macey, supra note 10; 
Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: 
Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35 J. PUB. ECON. 333, 336 (1988); Revesz, 
The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation, supra note 10, at 538–39. 
 154. Engel, State Environmental Standard Setting , supra note †, at 321 
(“[C]ommon sense would suggest that when choosing a location, a profit-maximizing 
producer would take the cost of compliance with local environmental regulations into 
account together with other local cost factors. . . .  This common sense notion is largely at 
odds, however, with the empirical literature.  Economists and political scientists who have 
conducted systematic studies of the impacts of state environmental regulation upon plant 
location decisions have nearly always concluded that, contrary to prevailing belief, the 
stringency of environmental standards is only a minor determinant of firm location.”); 
Jaffe et al., supra note 113, at 148; see also, e.g., ROBERT W. CRANDALL, MANUFACTURING 
ON THE MOVE 55–58 (1993); Stephen M. Meyer, Environmentalism and Economic 
Prosperity: An Update (1993), available at http://web.mit.edu/polisci/mpepp/ 
Reports/eepup.PDF; ROGER W. SCHMENNER, MAKING BUSINESS LOCATION DECISIONS 39–41 
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cutting critique is that even if there is a race to laxity, it is not to 
undesirability.  This counterargument posits that states which relax their 
standards value environmental protection less, and thus, are not reducing 
social utility.155  They are merely allowing the market to work, to put 
monetary values on goods consistent with demand.  Combine this with the 
economic return that states achieve by attracting industry to their 
boundaries with less stringent regulation, they argue, and a race to 
regulatory laxity may actually reflect a race to economic optimality.156  
Professor Revesz wrote: “[A] race to the bottom requires not just the 
existence of a ‘race,’ but also that the race be ‘to the bottom.’  This latter 
element requires . . . that the less stringent standards that emerge from the 
competitive process be socially undesirable.”157 
Despite these contentions, a more recent study by Professor Engel and 
Dr. Scott Saleska calls the pro-decentralization proponents’ position into 
doubt.158 Examining data on environmental quality and economic 
performance, Engel and Saleska found no “support for the efficiency 
hypothesis that increased environmental competitiveness leads to stronger 
economic performance.”159  On the contrary, their study showed that “a 
state’s willingness to ‘compete’ with other states by lowering environmental 
standards is associated with: (1) either no detectable effect or a significant 
negative effect on environmental indicators . . . and (2) no detectable impact, 
and sometimes even a negative impact, on indicators of economic 
performance . . . .”160 
In short, according to Engel and Saleska’s assessment, states that 
gamble with their environmental regulations in an effort  to court 
industry may break even, but they may also lose what they have put on 
the table—and what they have in the bank.  While no theory can perfectly 
predict all behavior in all circumstances, what Engel and Saleska observed 
sounds an awful lot like an environmental regulatory race to the bottom, 
on both possible counts. 
 
(1982); Timothy J. Bartik, The Effects of Environmental Regulation on Business Location 
in the United States, 19 GROWTH AND CHANGE 22 (1988); Virginia D. McConnell & 
Robert M. Schwab, The Impact of Environmental Regulation on Industry Location 
Decisions: The Motor Vehicle Industry, 66 LAND ECON. 67 (1990); Howard A. Stafford, 
Environmental Protection and Industrial Location, 75 ANN. ASS’N. AM. GEOGRAPHERS 
227 (1985). 
 155. See, e.g., Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental 
Regulation, supra note 10, at 550–51, 554–56. 
 156. See id. 
 157. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition, supra note 10, at 1219. 
 158. Saleska & Engel, supra note 10. 
 159. Id. at 67. 
 160. Id. at 66–67; see also supra note 151. 
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C.  Races to the Top 
Structurally, races to the top are simply the reverse of races to the 
bottom.161  Races to the bottom come in two parts: a race to laxity and a 
corresponding race to either desirability or undesirability.  So do races to 
the top: a race to strictness and a concomitant race to either desirability or 
undesirability.162  Races to the bottom are presumed to be to 
undesirability, but need not be.  Races to the top are the mirror image of 
this.163  They are assumed to trend to desirability, but might not.164  When 
a race to laxity in fact leads to undesirability, federal floors are a possible 
prophylactic.165  It is again just the opposite for races to the top: When a 
race to stringency trends to undesirability, the answer is not a federal floor 
but a federal ceiling.166 
Races to the top, like races to the bottom, also can be explained by the 
prisoner’s dilemma.167  The difference is that the incentives are reversed.  
Take again the hypothetical of the “Competitive state” seeking industry, 
but flip the assumptions.  Rather than assuming that laxer environmental 
regulation might attract industry by lowering the cost of doing business, 
assume that stricter environmental regulations will tend to attract 
business.168  This, of course, is not an entirely implausible assumption.  
For firms whose operation costs are little affected by environmental 
regulation, there are many reasons to be attracted to a more 
environmentally healthy jurisdiction.  For instance, their employees may 
tend to be happier, their employees might tend to be more productive (as 
they are happier and healthier), and their sales could tend to be higher (as 
they earn reputational gains for socially responsible decisions).169 
In this version of the hypothetical, then, states have a different 
dominant strategy.  It is the opposite of what they had in Professor Engel’s 
race to the bottom.  States now have an incentive to increase, rather than 
decrease, their environmental standards.170  What this means is that 
 
 161. See Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative, supra note 122, at 278–79. 
 162. See Swire, supra note 5, at 70. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 80. 
 165. See Burger, supra note 124, at 837. 
 166. See supra note at 124 and accompanying text. 
 167. See Engel, State Environmental Standard Setting, supra note †, at 301–05. 
 168. See Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition, supra note 10, at 1213–16. 
 169. Cf., e.g., Konisky, supra note 151, at 869. 
 170. Compare Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The 
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regardless of what one state does, the other is likely to strengthen its 
environmental regulation.  The incentives are fixed so that there will be a 
race to stringency. 
The question becomes whether the race to stringency is also one to 
desirability, or if it is to undesirability.  The answer is in the details.  
Assume, for instance, that two competing states, State A and State B, 
again have two options.  The options, though, are now different.  Rather 
than controlling pollution at a 90 percent emissions limit or dropping it to 
45 percent, the options become either to limit pollution at 90 percent or to 
raise that standard to 95 percent.  Either way, both states are likely to move 
to 95 percent to attract industry, but whether that means they are racing to 
optimality or suboptimality depends on the math. 
In one iteration of this hypothetical, racing to stringency might have 
few costs but many benefits.  This is a race to desirability.  In  this 
example, the monetary benefits remain the same as in Professor Engel’s 
race to the bottom.  If one state increases its environmental standards and 
the other does not, it will shift $75 of industry from the non-raising state 
to the standards-raising state.  In this instance, what changes are the 
environmental effects.  If raising the bar to 95 percent yields some 
increase in environmental quality, say $5 worth, and costs only $4 to 
implement, then the race will be both to stringency and to desirability.  
Both states will move to the more stringent position in an attempt to take 
the other’s business.  The industry will not shift.  However, both states 
will end up with slightly higher net benefits—by $1 each.  The example 
would play out this way: 
FIGURE 6: THE ENVIRONMENTAL PRISONER’S DILEMMA—RACING  












Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1437 
(1992) (positing a race to the bottom), and Cary, supra note 140, at 705, with Roberta 
Romano, Law as Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
225, 279–81 (1985) (suggesting a race to the top). 
 
  State B  
  
Maintain  
std. at 90% 
Increase  
std. to 95% 
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Maintain 
std. at 90% 
$250, $250 $175, $316 
Increase 
std. to 95% 
$316, $175 $251, $251 
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Flip the costs of the additional environmental compliance around, 
though, and a race to undesirability rather than desirability ensues.  Say, 
for instance, that the increase in environmental compliance still yields a 
benefit of $5 in environmental health.  Now, however, the price of that 
additional 5 percent of abatement is much more: $50 rather than $4.  Both 
states will still increase to 95 percent emissions control, because the net 
gain they experience computes.  If one state increases its standard and the 
other does not, the increasing state gets $75 of additional industry and 
pays only $45 to get it.  The choice is rational.  However, because both 
states increase their standards, industry does not move, and the states end 
up in an overall worse condition.  This looks like a race to the top because 
the tendency is to increase regulation, but the result is the exact opposite 
of what a race to the top assumes.  It is not net gains but net losses.  It 
looks like Figure 7.  This is why it is so critical to parse the questions of 
stringency and desirability separately—whether there is a race to 
stringency first and then whether that race to stringency is to optimality or 
suboptimality.  Theoretically, the states should end up better off by 
increasing their regulatory requirements.  In reality, they end up worse 
off. 
FIGURE 7: THE ENVIRONMENTAL PRISONER’S DILEMMA—RACING  













Examples of races to the top—either to desirability or undesirability—
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are much less common than cases of races to the bottom.  Perhaps the 
foremost examples come from the same realms in which scholars have 
argued there are races to the bottom, and in many ways are the 
counterparts of their downward cousins.  Some scholars contend, for 
instance, that the precursor to environmental law’s “republican moment” 
of the late 1960s and late 1970s was itself a race to the top.171  It is well 
established that in the run-up to the explosion of federal environmental 
law, states, as “laboratories of democracy,”172 drove the nation’s 
environmental law agenda.  They set pollution standards that the federal 
government dared not to.  They adopted laws to protect the public health, and 
over time, increasingly so.173  This has led some scholars to contend that 
this state-by-state action was its own race to the top:174 increased 
 
 171. James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in 
the American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 311–13 (1990).  For more on 
“republican moments” in environmental law, see, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Politics and 
Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 66–67 (1992); Christopher H. 
Schroeder, Rational Choice vs. Republican Moment-Explanations for Environmental 
Laws, 1969–1973, 9 DUKE ENVTL L. & POL’Y F. 29, 30–31, 45–46 (1998); David B. 
Spence, A Public Choice Progressivism, Continued, 87 CORNELL L. Rev. 397, 429–32, 
436 (2002).  Some commentators have called this the “environmental decade.”  ROBERT 
L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 63 (5th ed. 2007).  
Richard Lazarus has noted that the rapid emergence of federal environmental laws was 
perhaps more evolution than explosion.  See Richard J. Lazarus, THE MAKING OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 49 (2004) (calling the environmental legislation of the 1970s “a 
logical, albeit exponential, outgrowth of decades of legal evolution”—a convergence of 
“host of once-disparate strands of law and social movements [into] what we now think of 
as modern environmental law”).  See also David B. Spence, The Political Barriers to a 
National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1451 (2010) (suggesting why a federal RPS has not yet 
been able to achieve a “republican moment”). 
 172. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting).  For discussions of state environmental law before the 1970s, see, e.g., ROBERT 
V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 61–64, 
75–76 (5th ed. 2006); Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing a 
History of Environmental Protection, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 89, 107 (2002); Lincoln 
L. Davies, Lessons for an Endangered Movement: What a Historical Juxtaposition of the 
Legal Response to Civil Rights and Environmentalism Has to Teach Environmentalists 
Today, 31 ENVTL. L. 229, 271–75, 280–82 (2001); Markell, supra note 10, at 353–54; 
Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., The Legislative History of U.S. Air Pollution Control, 36 HOUS. L. 
REV. 679, 684-88 (1999). 
 173. California certainly did this with regulation of motor vehicle pollution—“mobile 
sources” in Clean Air Act speak—as well as in other environmental and consumer 
protection fields.  VOGEL, supra note 108, at 263; see also Raymond B. Ludwiszewski & 
Charles H. Haake, Cars, Carbon, and Climate Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 665, 675–77 
(2008). 
 174. See David Schoenbrod et al., Air Pollution: Building on the Successes, 17 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 284, 315–16 (2008) (“There are many examples of state and local 
governments racing ahead of the federal government on air pollution, and, more recently, 
in regulating greenhouse gases.  Many states and cities were reducing air pollution for 
decades before the federal government stepped in in 1970.”) (citing Indur M. Goklany, 
Empirical Evidence Regarding the Role of Nationalization in Improving U.S. Air Quality, 
in THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT: RETHINKING THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR 
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regulation over time by states in a way that was more stringent, and more 
desirable, than the vacuum of federal silence.  Likewise today, many 
observers have noted the plethora of state-based climate change 
initiatives while the federal government remains locked in stalemate.175  
One scholar has even coined the phrase “the  California effect” to 
describe this phenomenon, showing how one state with significant 
enough sway can help the tide rise for all jurisdictions.176  Similarly, 
business law scholars have argued that in response to the perceived shift 
by some states to more management-friendly corporate laws—business 
law’s presumptive race to the bottom—others have responded by making 
their own laws more shareholder-friendly—the field’s corresponding 
presumptive race to the top.177 
Whether these specific examples constitute races to the top or not, they 
make one thing clear.  Races to the top are certainly possible.  They are 
simply the “corresponding . . . puzzle piece[]” to races to the bottom.178  
Their effects, moreover, can be just as positive as has been traditionally 
assumed, or just as negative as in the race to the bottom itself, 
presumptions be damned. 
 
MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 27, 30 (R. Meiners & A. Morriss, eds., 2000)); cf. 
Wallace E. Oates, A Reconsideration of Environmental Federalism, in RECENT 
ADVANCES IN ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 1, 12–15, 17 (John A. List & Aart de Zeeuw 
eds., 2002); Jonathan Adler, The Ducks Stop Here? The Environmental Challenge to 
Federalism, 9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 205, 228–29 (2001).  The retort, of course, is that states 
took things only so far.  Federal intervention ultimately was necessary to ensure that all 
states, not just a few leaders, instituted needed protections. 
 175. See supra note 4. 
 176. See VOGEL, supra note 108, at 259.  Vogel defines this term as “the critical role 
of powerful and wealthy ‘green’ political jurisdictions in promoting a regulatory ‘race to 
the top’ among their trading partners.”  Id.  Notably, he argues that it must not be limited 
to its “impact [on] American federalism,” but rather, that it extends to the “ratcheting 
upward of regulatory standards in [all] competing political jurisdictions.”  Id.  
 177. Compare, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 170 (positing a race to the bottom), and 
Cary, supra note 140, at 705 (same), with, e.g., Romano, supra note 170, at 279–81 
(suggesting a race to the top).  “Even after decades of academic debate, however, no 
consensus exists as to whether the ability of a corporation’s managers to ‘choose’ the law 
of a particular jurisdiction is more likely to result in a race to the top or a race to the bottom 
in the market for corporate charters.”  John F. Coyle, Rethinking the Commercial Law 
Treaty, 45 GA. L. REV. 343, 401 (2011). 
 178. The Postal Service, Such Great Heights, on Give Up (Sub Pop Records 2003). 
DAVIES - FINAL AUTHOR EDITS ACCEPTED (2) (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/11/2016  9:34 AM 
 
44 
IV.  CONCEPTUALIZING RPS RACES 
The first step to determining whether the recent onslaught of state RPSs 
constitutes a race to the top is to put the laws in the right frame.  This is 
not a complicated task, but it is an important one.  What does the market 
look like?  Who are the participants, and how do they compete?  And what 
direction does that competition drive regulation?  Is it to laxity or to 
stringency, and does the result push to desirability or undesirability?  Perhaps 
the easiest way to answer these questions is to contrast a potential renewable 
energy race to the top with the putative environmental pollution race to the 
bottom. 
A. An Image 
Picturing the archetypal environmental regulatory race to the bottom is 
easy.  The market has already been outlined, its contours made clear.  It is 
a national market for industrial location.  It has roughly fifty-one players.  It 
is not overly concentrated.  And, to participate in the market, states use 
the stringency of their environmental regulation to engage in bidding wars 
to court industry.179 
This market thus has four primary traits: (1) it is a geographically broad 
market, in that industry might look anywhere for possible locations; (2) it is 
a competitive market, in that no landowner has sufficient market power to 
withhold the supply of possible industrial locations; (3) it is a price-driven 
market, or at least states appear to use price in an attempt to compete; and 
(4) the cost of environmental regulation is only one component of the 
ultimate price that is charged. 
To assess whether state environmental regulations drive this kind of 
race to the bottom is a two-step process.  First, the stringency or laxity of 
state environmental regulation must be measured over time.  Are states 
increasing or decreasing their environmental standards, and are they 
doing that to attract industry or for other purposes?  The conventional 
wisdom is that states sometimes decrease their standards in order to 
invite business into their borders.180  Second, what is the effect of that 
trend toward regulatory laxity?  Does it enhance social utility or diminish it?  
Is the loss of environmental quality compensated for by an increase in 
economic activity, or does the loss of health outweigh the value of more 
 
 179. See supra Part III.A. 
 180. Engel, State Environmental Standard Setting , supra note †, at 321 (“The 
prevailing impression is that the stringency of environmental standards is an important 
determinant of firm location.”); Jaffe et al., supra note 113, at 148 (“There appears to be 
widespread belief that environmental regulations have a significant effect on the siting of 
new plants in the United States.”). 
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money?  This is the optimality versus suboptimality question, the inquiry 
of desirability versus undesirability.181 
In this context, what some studies have shown is that, first, some state 
regulators do diminish their environmental standards and that, second, 
such reductions have little to no economic benefit—and may have negative 
environmental consequences.182  Thus, in at least some circumstances, 
there may be races to both laxity and undesirability.  Those studies that 
have attempted to refute these findings tend to focus on proving either that 
states do not lower their environmental standards, or that environmental 
quality might not diminish when they do.183 
In other words, to show that a race to the bottom does not exist, any link 
in the chain can be broken.  If states do not lower their environmental 
standards, there is no reason to assess whether there is a corresponding 
decrease in net social value because the prerequisite race to laxity does 
not exist.  Yet challenging the assertion that a race to laxity also leads to 
undesirability is a messier proposition.184  To demonstrate this, one must 
show that overall economic efficiency is harmed—that the net benefits of 
a regulatory change decrease rather than increase or stay neutral.  The 
tools used to do this are obvious, but the data are harder to compile and 
parse.  They include complicated questions of where and why industry 
locates; what the economic effects of those location decisions are, including 
estimates of added revenue to a state’s domestic product and job growth 
or loss; and the effect on the environment, including to public health, lost 
or gained work days, environmentally-linked illness and medical expenses, 
and damage to ecosystem services, just to name a few.  Similar questions 
can be asked in trying to determine whether state action denotes a 
 
 181. See supra notes 115–23 and accompanying text. 
 182. See Saleska & Engel, supra note 10, at 84; supra note 150–51, 148–49 and 
accompanying text. 
 183. See supra note 152–57 and accompanying text. 
 184. That states attempt to woo industry is undeniable.  The array of tax packages, 
subsidies, and other economic incentives states are willing to offer to convince industry to 
locate in their jurisdictions is both vast and well documented.  Indeed, that there are so 
many analyses of which states are most “business friendly” should be evidence enough of 
this trend.  One such report, the Manufacturing and Logistics Report Card compiled 
annually by the Center for Business and Economic Research at Ball State University, rates 
states on their human capital, tax climate, cost of employee benefits, availability of venture 
capital, and other factors.  See, e.g., Manufacturing and Logistics Report Card, CTR. FOR 
BUS. & ECON. RESEARCH AT BALL STATE (2011), http://cms.bsu.edu/Academics/ 
CentersandInstitutes/BBR/CurrentStudiesandPublications.aspx. 
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regulatory race to the top. 
B.  A Mirror Image? 
It is tempting to assume that a renewable energy race to the top is simply 
the conceptual mirror image of an environmental pollution race to the 
bottom.  In large part, that may be true.  Closer inspection, however, reveals 
some similarities as well as some differences. 
The general idea of a renewable energy race to the top is in fact the 
flipside of a pollution race to the bottom.  It is that, rather than 
decreasing environmental standards to attract industry, states might 
adopt environmentally beneficial measures—requirements for renewable 
energy—to attract industry.  This kind of market also looks much like 
the archetypal environmental race-to-the-bottom market.  It too is for 
industrial location, only for a different type of industry than in the race to 
the bottom.  It involves fifty-one players, the states plus the District of 
Columbia.  It should be a national market, because renewable facilities can 
be sited in every state.185  And like the race to the bottom, it is about 
states using their regulatory authority to change market signals.  To 
participate in this market, states use the stringency of their renewable 
energy requirements to woo industry. 
From here, however, some of the similarities diminish.  While the 
market may be national—electrons are electrons,186 whether supplied to 
the grid from coal or the sun, from plutonium or the wind—the market for 
renewable industry and installations may not be as uniform as the one for 
“dirty” industry in the race-to-the-bottom context.  Studies have shown 
that potential industrial locations are so plentiful in the United States that 
firms looking for a location typically consider only a handful of options 
seriously.187  While some firms may have unique needs, the basic 
 
 185. Numerous studies have concluded that there are renewable resources that could 
be used under a national RPS in every state.  See, e.g., ENERGY INFO., ADMIN., U.S. 
DEP’T OF ENERGY, REPORT VO. SR-OIAF/2007-05, ENERGY AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF 
IMPLEMENTING BOTH A 25-PERCENT RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD AND A 25-
PERCENT RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD BY 2025, at 14 (Aug. 2007), available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/eeim/pdf/sroiaf(2007)05.pdf; see Sovacool & 
Cooper, supra note 6, at 35; see Nogee et al., supra note 106, at 39. 
 186. The maxim in the electricity industry is that “electrons cannot be colored,” the 
shorthand references to “green” electrons in this article notwithstanding.  The Supreme 
Court repeatedly has acknowledged this truth of physics.  See, e.g., New York v. Fed. 
Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 7 n.5 (2002) (recognizing that once energy is 
placed into the grid, “consumers then draw undifferentiated energy from that grid” 
(citation omitted)(internal quotation marks omitted)); see, e.g., Fed. Power Comm’n v. 
Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 458 (1972) (finding that transmitted electricity 
constitutes interstate commerce). 
 187. See Engel, State Environmental Standard Setting, supra note †, at 318 n.132 
(“Evidence that the number of states engaged in competition for a single plant is small is 
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requirements of infrastructure, a workforce, and other resources likely can 
be found in multiple states.188  Thus, theoretically at least, Texas can 
compete with Tennessee for an industry looking to relocate, just as South 
Dakota can compete with South Carolina.  Of course, because firms typically 
only look at a few states to site industrial facilities, there also is an 
argument that they have the ability to exercise “disproportionate market 
power,” forcing states into what “resemble[s more of] a strategic game 
than a perfectly competitive neoclassical market” to  gain their 
business.189 
For renewable energy, there are even more limits on a state’s ability to 
compete.  Because the nation’s electricity system is divided up into three 
chief parts (minus Hawaii and Alaska),190 and because it features significant 
transmission constraints, one state’s RPS may be more attractive to a 
potential renewable facility than another’s.  Locating, for instance,  in 
Arizona might give much easier access to California’s  burgeoning 
markets than building in Montana.191 
Likewise, there are clear differences in states’ renewable resource wealth.  
There is more, and stronger, sun in the desert Southwest than in the upper 
Midwest.192  There is more wind in Kansas than Kentucky.193  Thus, while 
all states have some resources that can be tapped to make renewable-based 
 
largely anecdotal, though some of it rests upon industry practice. . . .  [I]t is rare to hear of 
more than two to four states, or, for that matter, states from more than one region, 
competing for a single industrial plant.  That the number of states competing for new plants 
is few is consistent with the industry practice of keeping the list of sites they are 
considering secret until they have narrowed down the list of candidate states to just a few.  
Corporations do so to keep real estate prices low.” (citations omitted)). 
 188. See id. at 316–17. 
 189. Id. at 319. 
 190. E.g., PETER C. CHRISTENSEN, RETAIL WHEELING: A GUIDE FOR END-USERS 21 
(2d ed. 1996); see Interconnections of the North American Electric Reliability Council in 
the Contiguous United States, 1998, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.eia.doe.gov/ 
electricity/page/prim2/fig15.gif. 
 191. This is, for instance, an aim of San Diego Gas & Electric’s Sunrise Power 
project.  See The Powerlink Story, SAN DIEGO GAS & ELEC., http://www.sdge.com/ 
sunrisepowerlink/powerlink_story (last visited Sept. 13, 2011). 
 192. Concentrating Solar Resources of the United States, NAT’L RENEWABLE 
ENERGY LAB. (Oct. 20, 2008), http://www.nrel.gov/gis/images/map_csp_national_lo-
res.jpg; Photovoltaic Solar Resources of the United States, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY 
LAB. (Oct. 20, 2008), http://www.nrel.gov/gis/images/map_pv_national_lo-res.jpg. 
 193. Wind Powering America: 80-Meter Wind Maps and Wind Resource Potential, 
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov/wind_maps.asp (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2011). 
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electricity, the differences among states may fragment the RPS race-to-
the-top market more than the pollution race-to-the-bottom market is.194  
Potentially, this resource disparity, plus existing transmission limitations, 
could mean that renewable energy race-to-the-top markets play out less 
nationally than might be presumed initially. 
Moreover, states that use RPSs to try to garner renewable installations 
compete in a different way than do states that reduce their environmental 
standards to attract industry.  Race-to-the-bottom states compete directly 
on price.  RPS states do not.  An RPS does not change the direct cost that 
the firm building the facility will pay to do business in the state.  Instead, 
the RPS attempts to lower the investment risk the firm faces in making the 
decision where to locate: It does not guarantee a lower total cost of 
production, but rather, a guaranteed amount of demand for the product 
that the company is selling.  Whether renewables firms view this kind of 
demand guarantee as more or less preferable to a cost discount is open to 
debate.195  But it does mean that, unlike the pollution-based race to the 
bottom, RPS states are competing on something other than price. 
The image of the market that RPS states compete in, then, is a likeness 
to but not quite a facsimile of the environmental race to the bottom.  It 
also has four key characteristics, but the characteristics are slightly shifted.  
The market is: (1) national generally, but potentially fragmented regionally 
by transmission constraints and resource availability; (2) competitive, but 
perhaps not as competitive as that for industrial sites because renewable 
resources are not spread uniformly across the country; (3) a demand-
assurance, rather than price-competition, market; and (4) driven in part by 
the demand that RPSs seek to foment but by other factors as well, just as 
the cost of environmental regulation is only one component of the total 
cost that firms pay to do business in any state in an environmental law 
race to the bottom. 
Measuring whether there is an RPS race to the top also looks much like 
how one might assess the existence of a pollution race to the bottom.  It 
takes two steps.  The first is to evaluate the direction of regulation: Are RPSs 
becoming more stringent over time?  Then, if the answer to that question 
is yes, a determination of whether such increasing stringency leads to a 
socially desirable, or a socially undesirable, outcome is necessary. 
The prevailing assumption today is that more renewable energy is 
socially desirable.196  There are good reasons for this presumption.  
 
 194. This certainly has been an argument advanced by opponents of a national RPS.  
See Davies, Power Forward, supra note 6, at 1357. 
 195. Cf. Ringel, supra note 32. 
 196. JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY: PRELUDE TO CLIMATE 
CHANGE 92, 119 (2011) (“[S]ince the turn of the millennium, a consensus energy policy 
has been emerging . . . .  Our energy future no longer resides in fossil fuels; it resides in a 
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Renewable energy has many established benefits, including pollution 
reduction, greater energy security, arguable stability in terms of fuel 
diversity, and reduced pressure on limited fossil fuels.197  As Professor 
Amy Wildermuth has aptly summarized, “The key observation at this 
juncture is that every source of energy is based on a natural resource. . . .  
[E]very time we create energy, the central ingredient is some part of 
nature. . . .  The advantage of [renewable] power sources is that they do 
not deplete resources to generate energy.”198 
Just because renewable energy has its benefits, however, does not mean 
that more and more of it necessarily maximizes social utility.  Even the 
most ardent advocates of renewable electricity must acknowledge that the 
United States today cannot handle an all-renewables grid.  The 
infrastructure does not exist.  Transmission is not sufficient.199  Renewables 
are not dispatchable, nor are they baseload.200  And we lack economical 
electricity storage that would allow this generation resource to move out 
of the netherworld of neither baseload nor peaking power into one of those 
categories.201  Moreover, renewables cost more than many other energy 
resources, including natural gas, coal, and, in terms of operating costs 
alone, nuclear.202  This is, in part, why Professor Jim Rossi has 
criticized a possible national RPS as risking the displacement of relatively 
climate-friendly generation, like natural gas, rather than other, more 
carbon-intensive resources, like coal.203  Further, renewables create some 
environmental dilemmas of their own, even if they are less acute than 
 
substantial ramping up of energy efficiency and renewable resources.”). 
 197. See, e.g., Christopher Cooper, A National Renewable Portfolio Standard: 
Politically Correct or Just Plain Correct?, ELECTRICITY J., June 2008, at 9, 10; Brent M. 
Haddad & Paul Jefferiss, Forging Consensus on National Renewables Policy: The 
Renewables Portfolio Standard and the National Public Benefits Trust  Fund, 
ELECTRICITY J., Mar. 1999, at 68, 69. 
 198. Wildermuth, The Next Step, supra note 86, at 371–72. 
 199. See, e.g., Joshua P. Fershee, Misguided Energy: Why Recent Legislative, 
Regulatory, and Market Initiatives Are Insufficient to Improve the U.S. Energy 
Infrastructure, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 327, 331–32 (2007); James A. Holtkamp & Mark A. 
Davidson, Transmission Siting in the Western United States: Getting Green Electrons to 
Market, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 379, 380 (2010); Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Electric Power 
Transmission Line Siting Authority, 39 ENVTL. L. 1015, 1029 (2009). 
 200. Wildermuth, The Next Step, supra note 86, at 373–74. 
 201. VACLAV SMIL, ENERGY 171–72 (2006). 
 202. Davies, Power Forward, supra note 6, at 1371. 
 203. Rossi, Commentary, supra note 22, at 1438, 1440; see also Karen Palmer & 
Dallas Burtraw, Cost-Effectiveness of Renewable Electricity Policies, 27 ENERGY ECON. 
873 (2005). 
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those of other energy sources.204  In addition, because they are neither 
consistent nor dispatchable, putting too many on the grid too quickly 
could significantly diminish system reliability.205  There are, in short, 
disadvantages as well as advantages to renewables.  Thus, potentially, 
putting too many on the grid at once could be detrimental: in regulatory 
race speak, suboptimal. 
If state RPSs constitute a regulatory race to stringency, calculating 
whether that race is also to optimality is no easy task.  Weighing the 
benefits and costs of renewables is a complicated, data-intensive endeavor 
that demands sophisticated economic tools and information:206  It may be 
that there is a renewable energy “sweet spot”—not too little but not too 
much.  That sweet spot may move around over time, and current RPSs might 
be pushing the nation’s generation portfolio to it, or past it.  As it turns 
out, however, making that calculation is not necessary because we can 
stop at the first step of the race-to-the-top inquiry.  What the data appear 
to show is that state RPSs do not reflect a regulatory race to the top at 
all—not because RPSs clearly push one way to social  desirability or 
undesirability, but because they appear not to be converging on a 
dominant strategy of heightened stringency. 
V.  MEASURING RPS RACES 
From the fanfare they have received, it would seem obvious that state 
RPSs constitute a shining example of a traditional race to the top—a race 
to stringency and to desirability.  The truth is less obvious, and more 
complicated.  It is undisputable that states increasingly have adopted 
RPSs.  It is also clear that, on average, state RPSs today are more 
aggressive than the RPSs of, say, 2001.  This indicates that at least some 
states are racing each other.  They use increasingly stringent laws to try to 
drive renewable electricity installations to their states. 
The full picture, however, is much messier.  While the rush to adopt 
RPSs is remarkable, a number of states still have no RPS at all.  Many 
more states that have RPSs have adopted flexible standards that are not 
really mandates but suggestions.  Moreover, the aggressiveness of these 
laws is all over the map.  States today tend to adopt more aggressive RPS 
requirements than in the past.  But not all do.  Some states have recently 
 
 204. Wildermuth, The Next Step, supra note 86, at 378–79. 
 205. Rossi, Commentary, supra note 22, at 1439–40. 
 206. The sheer number of—and differences in—studies prognosticating the possible 
effect of a national RPS illustrates this.  See Davies, Power Forward, supra note 6, at 
1370–75, 1382–84 (discussing the studies); Rossi, Commentary, supra note 22, at 1439 & 
nn.50–51 (noting disagreement among researchers over whether a national RPS would 
displace natural gas or coal-fired generation). 
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passed RPSs no more potent than some of the early RPSs—and many other 
states have left their less stringent laws in place, despite action by their 
counterparts upping the ante on RPS ambitiousness.  Other measures confirm 
this.  The design of RPSs over time is diverse, not unidirectional. 
Together, this evidence points to a single conclusion: There is no 
predominating race to the top in state RPSs.  If there were, one would 
expect to see evidence of a dominant strategy that states employ—the 
equivalent of confessing in the prisoner’s dilemma.  Instead, what the data 
show is that some states employ a dominant strategy, making their laws 
more and more aggressive, but many others do not.  This implies that there 
is not a general race to stringency, but rather, a situation where if using 
more renewables is a societal goal, federal action may be necessary. 
A.  The Evidence 
Evaluating whether state RPSs constitute a race to the top might be 
approached from a number of vantages, but the starting point is whether 
they constitute a race to stringency.  Here, two metrics matter: (1) how 
many states have RPSs, and (2) what the substance of those RPSs is.207 
The first metric is relatively straightforward.  If only one or two states 
were using RPSs to attract industry, the argument that this constitutes a 
race to the top would be tenuous.  If, however, more players were entering 
the game, the argument would become stronger.  That is, because the 
adoption of an RPS is itself a signal that a state wants to attract renewables 
installations to its borders, whether a state has done so is at least one way 
of measuring whether a state is trying to use its legislative power to 
compete for renewable industry.  To be sure, not all jurisdictions must be 
participating in a regulatory race for there to be one.  However, because 
virtually every state has some kind of renewable energy resource it could 
seek to tap, because RPSs can be and are written to target specific 
resources, and because states are free to adopt very modest RPSs that, 
politically, might be seen as costing very little—many states have voluntary 
 
 207. Unless otherwise noted, all data is based on statutory enactments, except for a 
limited number of states (e.g., Arizona, New York) in which it was necessary to use 
administrative regulations and executive pronouncements to measure RPS design.  Where 
state statutes do not express their RPSs in terms of a percentage of consumption (e.g., 
Iowa, Texas), estimated percentage targets were calculated using publicly available peak 
load data. 
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RPSs208—the choice to adopt an RPS is at least partially indicative of 
whether a regulatory race is occurring.  RPSs, in other words, do not just 
change who gets what portion of a fixed payoff.  They create a new payoff.  
They create demand for renewable energy. 
What states are doing on this score is transparent.  They either adopt 
RPSs or they do not.  Thus, the first metric examined is the frequency of 
state RPS adoption.  It is discussed in Part V.B.1 infra. 
The second question, RPS substance, is harder to measure.  State 
RPSs are designed with such diversity that juxtaposing the laws can be 
difficult.  Nevertheless, there are at least four measures that both cut 
across RPS designs and that are indicative of RPS stringency.  They are: 
(1) the RPS’s percentage target; (2) its percentage target as amended over 
time; (3) the portion of customers (or “load”) in a state to which the law 
applies; and (4) the speed at which the RPS must be met (its percentage 
target over time).  Measures (1), (2), and (4) can be extracted from the 
RPSs themselves; measure (3) is available from the Database of State 
Incentives for Renewable Energy (“DSIRE”) complied by the North 
Carolina State University Solar Center.  These data are discussed in Part 
V.B.2-5 infra. 
RPS percentage targets, of course, can be gamed.  Hidden exceptions, 
exclusions, and loopholes can—and are—built into RPSs.  Thus, cross-
checking what an RPS says it does against what it actually does may be 
important.  This kind of corroboration can help avoid possible distortion 
from relying solely on an RPS’s facial design characteristics.  Empirics 
on RPS performance remain scant, but there is at least one measure that 
can be used to confirm what the other data show: how the facial metrics 
on RPS aggressiveness match up with the laws’ efficacy tendency.  This 
metric also is an imperfect gauge of RPS aggressiveness.209  RPS “efficacy 
tendency” scores are proxies for RPS performance, not actual measures of 
it.210  Nevertheless, comparing facial RPS design characteristics against 
this cross-check provides at least some assurance that reliance on statutory 
text alone does not skew the results.  This metric is discussed in Part V.B.6 
infra. 
Finally, assuming that the evidence shows there is an RPS race to 
stringency, assessing whether that race also is to optimality or  
 
 208. States’ adoption of voluntary RPSs might indicate a race—or the lack of one.  
See text accompanying infra notes 213–15. 
 209. Another possible cross-check would be to measure RPS design against what 
renewable energy is produced in the state prior to adoption—and how much of this 
preexisting power production counts toward the RPS goal.  This is one aspect of what 
some scholars call “salience distortion”; it is captured, partially, by the efficacy tendency 
metric.  See infra note 220. 
 210. See Davies, Power Forward, supra note 6, at 1386–87. 
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suboptimality is necessary.  As noted, this would require a sophisticated 
economic calculus211 parsing what level of renewables use is desirable, 
taking into account other options, relative fuel values, all externalities, and 
the long-term value of conservation and sustainability, to name only a few 
considerations.  Because, however, it appears there is not a race to 
stringency with state RPSs, it is not necessary to also determine whether 
these laws create an ensuing race to undesirability. 
B.  Weighing the Evidence 
Five metrics of RPS design point in five different directions.  RPSs have 
been adopted with increasing frequency.  They are more aggressive, 
generally but not always.  Amendments do tend to make the laws more 
vigorous, but they also often grant more time for compliance.  The 
percentage of customers covered runs the gamut, as does the speed at 
which states expect utilities to get there.  RPS design overall, as 
measured by the laws’ “efficacy tendency,” likewise is remarkably diverse.  
By any measure, this is not a picture of a race to stringency.  If anything, 
the evidence shows some states racing, many not, and perhaps some 
presaging a kind of race to the bottom—in short, hardly a ringing 
endorsement of the notion of a renewable energy race to the top. 
1.  Frequency 
The thing that drew attention to RPSs as a potential regulatory race in 
the first place is perhaps the best argument in favor of an RPS race to the top.  
It is undisputed that states increasingly have adopted RPSs.  That is, it is clear 
that by adopting RPSs, more and more states have used legislative 
enactments to signal to renewable energy developers that they want the 
business in their state.  The numbers tell the story, but the best way to see 
it is over time.  As Figure 8 shows, in 1993, only one state had an RPS: Iowa. 





 211. See supra Part IV.B. 
 














By the middle of the decade, this had begun to change, but only 
marginally.  In 1996, as Figure 9 shows, only three states had RPSs.  They 
were Iowa, Minnesota, and New Mexico. 















At the turn of the century, the RPS trend truly began to catch on.  
Between 1996 and the coming of the millennium, there was a virtual 
explosion of RPS enactments.  Nine more states adopted RPSs, quadrupling 
the number of states with these laws to a full dozen.  Figure 10 details which 
states had RPSs in 2000. 
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A decade later, the number of states with RPSs had more than tripled 
again.  In just ten years, another twenty-four states plus the District of 
Columbia adopted RPSs.  Now the map looked almost exactly the opposite 
as it had twenty years earlier.  Rather than showing an expanse of white 
with a few islands of green, more states had RPSs than did not.  Almost 
the entire nation had gone green.  The islands were the few areas of non-
RPS states.  In fact, if passage of an RPS were to count as a vote to amend 
the Constitution, enough states would have voted in favor of this 
hypothetical amendment by 2010 to put it on the verge of ratification.212  
No wonder the suggestions that states were engaging in a race to the top 
were so loud. 














 212. Proposed amendments to the federal Constitution must be ratified “by the 
Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths 
thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress.”  
U.S. Const. art. V. 
 








Considering RPSs in this way very much makes them look like a race 
to the top, at least on the surface.  Charting state RPS enactments over 
time reveals what appears to be a clear trend.  It is very directional—very 
upward.  As seen in Figure 12, this is, as one would expect, much what a 
race to the top should look like: an increasing trend over time to a point at 
which the trend plateaus, the plateau in turn reflecting the dominant 
strategy.  Certainly very few races to the top will cut a perfectly straight 
upward diagonal line with a plateau at the end, but the race’s general 
trajectory should bear these markers.  As each competing state puts its 
dominant strategy into play, the tally of those in the “mutual defection” box 
of the prisoner’s dilemma should increase: As time passes, the total of 
states enacting the law in question increases.  This is what has happened 
for RPSs.  In 1993, RPSs covered a lone state.  Now, they cover almost 
three-quarters of the nation.  If that does not sound at least to some degree 
like a state-based ratcheting up of pressure for more renewables, very little 
will—especially given states’ unabashed enthusiasm for using RPSs to 
attract jobs and industry.213 


















 213. See supra Part II.C. 
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On the other hand, the maps of states with RPSs tell another story.  
While a majority of states has adopted these laws, a substantial minority has 
not—even when their neighbors put their own RPSs in place years ago.  
Idaho, Wyoming, and Nebraska are surrounded by states with RPSs.  As of 
2010, Indiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee also remain sandwiched by RPS 
states.  Yet not one has taken the chance to pass an RPS, a chance that has 
presented itself every year for the last two decades.  There may be 
eminently rational explanations for this behavior.  Some states have more 
renewable resources than others do.  States clearly differ politically.  Some 
states may want to export their renewable power rather than forcing it to be 
used inside their own jurisdiction.  Regardless of the reason for inaction, 
however, from the perspective of a possible race to the top, it leaves a 
glaring hole.  If RPSs are how states compete for renewable energy 
industry and jobs—if the race’s dominant strategy is to try to create more 
demand for renewables by adopting an RPS—the fact that a full quarter 
of the nation still has not done so cuts against the idea that there is such a 
race. 
Indeed, considering how states have adopted RPSs potentially raises 
further questions about whether there is an RPS race to the top at all.  
Pulling back the layers of these laws reveals another possible flaw in the 
race-to-the-top theory.  Not only are there twelve states that remain RPS 
holdouts, but a number of states that have adopted RPSs have done so in 
a way that is rather meek.  Seven states have RPSs that cannot be counted as 
mandatory renewable energy requirements, but rather, are only voluntary 
suggestions that electric utilities use more renewables.214 
This phenomenon pushes in two possible directions.  At one level, the 
fact that some states have adopted what many would consider faux RPSs 
might actually bolster the suggestion that there is an RPS race to the top. 
In this view, states consider the very adoption of an RPS, no matter how 
vigorous or laggard, a signal to developers that they are open for renewable 
energy business.  So states are willing to send that signal however they 
can.  At another level, however, the adoption of effectively ersatz RPSs 
belies the suggestion of a race to the top.  In this view, states know that 
they are likely to attract renewable energy business to their states only if 
 
 214. See RPS Policies, supra note 8. 
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they send a signal stronger than surrounding states.  If there were a real 
regulatory race, that is, states not only would adopt RPSs but would do so 
with increasing vigor. 
If the second view is credited, the fact that seven states have enacted 
this kind of symbolic legislation arguably further undermines the idea of 
an RPS regulatory race.  There is some reason to lean this way.  Indeed, 
one might debate whether to count voluntary RPSs as true RPSs at all.215  
At least one reputable organization tracking RPSs and other renewable 
energy policies appears not to.216  If these voluntary RPSs are not counted as 
real RPSs, the tally of states that are considered to have RPSs plummets.  The 
total barely reaches sixty percent, casting additional doubt on the notion 
that there is truly an RPS race to the top. 
2.  Targets 
The data on how aggressive RPSs are plays out roughly the same way.  
On the surface, the data on RPS targets indicate that states are adopting more 
and more vigorous RPSs as time goes by.  Below the surface, however, a 
more complicated picture emerges. 
Strip away all the ways an RPS can be written, and perhaps the most 
indicative measure of its ambitiousness is its renewable percentage target.  
A race to the top, seen through the lens of this metric, should, again, 
approximate an upward sloping diagonal line that plateaus: As time 
passes, state enactments become more aggressive in what they try to 
achieve, until they reach a plateau where the dominant strategy is 
attained.217 
Plotting, from 1997 to 2035, the average of all RPS targets that were or 
will be in effect during each of those years creates an image that looks 
very much like the race to the top just described.  The line is not straight, 
but it definitely moves upward.  Moreover, it plateaus at a mean of just 
under 20 percent renewables:218 revealing the dominant strategy of the 
RPS prisoner’s dilemma? 
 
 215. See supra note 8. 
 216. See id. (distinguishing between states with “renewable portfolio standards” and 
those with “renewable portfolio goals”). 
 217. A potential counter to this description of what an RPS target race should look 
like is that for states to be racing, all they really need do is adopt a more aggressive RPS 
than they otherwise would have, not that they pass a more vigorous law than their neighbor 
did.  This is the corollary of the argument that voluntary RPSs prove the presence of a 
regulatory race, rather than raise doubts of whether there is one.  Of course, measuring 
with any precision what effect one state’s promotion of renewable energy has on another 
jurisdiction’s adoption of an RPS is an intractable, if not impossible, endeavor. 
 218. For this calculation, where the statute did not specify otherwise, the RPS target 
in effect for a given year was extrapolated linearly from the final target year back to the 
initial effective year. 
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Averages, of course, mask variation.  Thus, it is important to consider 
not just the mean of what states are doing but the specific actions 
themselves.  Doing so exposes much more disparity in state RPS action.  
Rather than every state rushing to a 20 percent renewables dominant 
strategy, state enactments vary wildly.  Figure 14, then, gives a much 
clearer view than Figure 13 of how states are acting in the suggested 
RPS race to the top.  It marks the highest target a state’s RPS seeks to achieve, 
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FIGURE 14: RPS TARGET AGGRESSIVENESS—BY INITIAL                






















There are two important observations about this data.  First, as Figure 
14 makes clear, the general trajectory of state RPSs over time is still 
generally upward.  No state that adopted an RPS in 2009, 2010, or 2011 
put in place a mandate below fifteen percent.  The same cannot be said for 
early RPSs, many of which imposed targets in the single digits.  Moreover, a 
number of states recently have adopted RPSs with remarkably aggressive 
targets—Hawaii’s forty percent and California’s thirty-three percent, for 
instance.219  This generally was not true of early RPSs; the first law to 
break the thirty percent barrier was not passed until 2007. 
Second, and more important from the perspective of a possible RPS 
 
 219. S.B. 2, 2011 Leg., 1st Ext. Sess. (Cal. 2011), amending Cal. Pub. Util. Code    § 
399.15(b)(2)(B) (West 2011). 
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regulatory race, these data show no clear dominant strategy in the adoption 
of RPS targets.  True, the laws have tended to be more aggressive over time.  
But that is not what matters.  States are not just adopting RPSs and then 
leaving those laws untouched.  Many states have amended their laws, 
often more than once.  Further, new states are enacting RPSs for the first 
time years after other states’ laws have been put in place.  Thus, the clear 
trend that one would expect to see if a race to the top existed would be 
convergence around an “aggressive enough” percentage requirement, the 
race’s dominant strategy. 
The data do not bear out such a strategy.  States adopted RPSs in the 
late 1990s with far higher targets than many of those states that entered 
the RPS fray later on.  And while some states are getting truly aggressive, 
instituting targets as high as forty percent, many states that adopted or 
amended their RPSs in the last five years have put in place targets barely 
a third or a quarter as aggressive as the most ambitious states.  This hardly 
suggests a race to stringency, but rather, exposes remarkable diversity in 
the aggressiveness of state RPSs.  Using RPS targets, in short, reveals no 
dominant strategy that would mark an RPS race. 
When other factors are taken into account, moreover, the aggressiveness 
of RPS targets over time becomes even less clear.  There are numerous 
factors that make some RPSs less vigorous in reality than they initially 
appear—what some commentators might refer to as the laws’ “salience 
distortion.”220  An RPS, for instance, might only require the installation 
of renewable capacity, not the production of actual  renewable energy; 
it might count preexisting renewables installations; or it might give credit 
to nonrenewable resources, such as advanced coal or nuclear 
installations, as well as renewables themselves.221  Gauging precisely 
the salience distortion of each state’s RPS exceeds the scope of this article.  
Nevertheless, the mere fact that not all RPS targets are in reality what 
they appear to be on the surface further exacerbates the noisiness of the 
RPS target data.  Indeed, virtually every RPS on the books has some 
level of salience distortion.222  That fact alone yields a clear implication: 
It amplifies the suggestion that there is not an RPS race to stringency. 
 
 220. See Davies, Power Forward, supra note 6, at 1361; see also, e.g., Daniel 
Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economists, 93 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1449, 1468 (2003); Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, and 
Statutory Sleight of Hand: Salience Distortion in American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 
MINN. L. REV. 1110, 1114–15 (2008); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment 
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1130–31 (1974). 
 221. See Davies, Power Forward, supra note 6, at 1361. 
 222. See id. at 1361, 1388.  A prior analysis showed that, of states with RPSs at the 
time, only four had no salience distortion, eighteen had mild salience distortion, eight had 
a moderate amount, and six had more than a moderate amount.  Id. at 1388. 
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3.  Speed 
A similar observation can be made based on another measurement of 
RPS aggressiveness.  One mark of an RPS’s vigorousness is its ultimate 
target; another is how quickly that target must be met.  Hypothetically, 
one would think that if states were in a race to attract renewable industry 
to their borders, they would not only tend to adopt bigger RPS targets over 
time but also would require faster and faster compliance with those goals.  
This makes sense for at least two reasons.  First, a more rapid compliance 
period should generate additional pressure to build facilities.  Second, 
states joining the race relatively late should want to catch up with those 
who had a head start.  Using a faster compliance timeline compared to 
your competitors is a logical way to do that. 
FIGURE 15: ALLOTTED TIME FOR RPS SATISFACTION—BY             




























The data, however, do not reflect this putative trend.  In this case, if 
there were an RPS race, one would expect to see a downward sloping line 
to a valley: an emerging dominant strategy of allowing fewer and fewer 
years to meet the RPS compliance as statutes are enacted over time, with a 
leveling off in the trend line at some period of time reflecting the 
minimum needed to connect renewables to the grid.223  Yet what the data 
show, as Figure 15 depicts, is no such dominant strategy.  Instead, the 
statute that allows the most compliance time—over twenty years—was 
adopted in one of the last years plotted on the graph, 2010.  Likewise, 
more recently adopted statutes do not tend to allow less time for 
compliance.  Rather, if anything, RPSs adopted or amended after 2005 
tend to allow more time for compliance than their earlier counterparts: 
closer to ten or fifteen years than to five or ten.  This is hardly a death 
knell for the notion of an RPS race to the top but, when taken together 
with the target data, it certainly makes the likelihood of such a regulatory race 
diminish. 
4.  Coverage 
Yet another metric of RPS design points away from, rather than toward, an 
RPS race to the top.  A further way to gauge RPS forcefulness is how broadly 
it applies inside a jurisdiction.  Comparing two otherwise identical RPSs, the 
one that applies to all of a state’s electricity demand must be considered 
more vigorous than the other that applies only to half of the state’s demand.  
Because DSIRE keeps data on the percentage of customers, or “load,” to 
which RPSs apply,224 this data can be used to track another way that states 
may or may not be competing in a regulatory race. 
  
 
 223. One would not expect to see the line decrease indefinitely, because it typically 
takes several years to site a new energy installation.  See Kenneth T. Kristl, Renewable 
Energy and Preemption: Lessons from Siting LNG Terminals , NAT. RESOURCES & 
ENV’T, Winter 2009, at 58, 59 (reporting an average of four to seven years). 
 224. The RPS load data are available at Quantitative RPS Data Project, DATABASE 
OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY (June 1, 2011), http://www. 
dsireusa.org/rpsdata/index.cfm.  For this article, data from DSIRE’s June 2011 spreadsheet 
were used. 
DAVIES - FINAL AUTHOR EDITS ACCEPTED (2) (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/11/2016  9:34 AM 
[VOL. 3:  3, 2011–12]  State Renewable Portfolio Standards 
 SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY 
LAW  
 65 
FIGURE 16: PERCENTAGE OF RPS LOAD COVERAGE—BY                 























Again, it appears that states are not racing.  Using this load coverage 
metric, a dominant strategy of a race to stringency should manifest as an 
upward sloping line to a plateau, with states passing laws that cover more 
and more load as time goes by.  As Figure 16 indicates,225 however, this is 
not what the data suggest.  Instead, if anything, there is a general tendency 
for states to include three-quarters or more of their load within their RPSs, 
but this has been then trend from the beginning.  Most states, in fact, make 
eighty-five percent or more of their load subject to their RPSs, but 
according to the DSIRE data, those states that have included the lowest 
 
 225. Figure 16 is an admittedly rough estimate of trends on RPS load coverage.  This 
is because the DSIRE data is for current coverage and does not extend prior to 2009.  A 
historical outlook would provide a fuller picture. 
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percentage electricity demand in their laws have adopted their RPSs more, 
rather than less, recently: The lowest percentage was put in place in 2006, 
the second lowest in 2005, and the third lowest in 2010.  Yet again, this 
measure, like the other metrics of RPS stringency, is indicative of some 
states attempting to design vigorous laws but others using RPSs 
symbolically.  It is, in other words, not indicative of a true race to 
stringency. 
5.  Amendments 
Initially, that RPSs have been amended so frequently might be considered 
a sign that states are racing each other.  The sheer frequency of changes 
to these laws could indicate that states keep adjusting their RPSs’ 
aggressiveness in response to other jurisdictions entering the renewables 
game.  In fact, of the thirty-seven states with RPSs, twenty states—a 
remarkable fifty-four percent—have amended their statutes at least once 
since initial enactment.  Ten states—or twenty-seven percent—have 
amended their RPSs more than once. 
Despite what this data might suggest, a deeper assessment of the 
amendments reveals a more complex story than a straightforward race to 
stringency.  Notably, most states that amend their RPSs tend to increase 
their law’s target when they do so.  In the amendments to date, this 
happened nearly eighty percent of the time.  This situation appears 
consistent with a theory of state amendments passed in an effort either to 
compete with other states or, at the least, to become more aggressive over 
time generally. 
  
DAVIES - FINAL AUTHOR EDITS ACCEPTED (2) (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/11/2016  9:34 AM 
[VOL. 3:  3, 2011–12]  State Renewable Portfolio Standards 
 SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY 
LAW  
 67 






















That, however, is not the whole picture.  As Figure 17 shows, a fifth of 
the time states did not increase their RPS targets at all when they 
amended—and in almost a tenth of cases, they actually decreased it.  That 
some amendments do not ratchet a state’s RPS target upward is hardly 
surprising.  There are many reasons to amend a law; only one of them is 
to make the target itself more stringent.  But the fact that more than twenty 
percent of amendments do not increase the target, and that sometimes the 
target actually decreases through the legislative process, cannot be 
considered evidence of a true race to the top.  If it were, a dominant strategy 
of ever-increasing targets through amendments should emerge, not one of 
most-of-the-time upward movement but also stagnation plus some 
downward movement as well.  This evidence on amendments thus appears 
to confirm that something more complex than a single race to the top 
among states is happening. 
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FIGURE 18: AMENDMENTS TO RPS TARGETS—BY ALLOWANCE OF 























Indeed, when the nature of these amendments is taken into account, the 
argument that they demonstrate a clear race to the top weakens further.  In 
general, states grant more time to comply with their RPSs about 60 percent 
of the time when they amend their statutes for any reason.  This figure 
increases further when only the twenty-six amendments that increased states’ 
RPS targets are considered.  More than two-thirds of those changes also 
extended—sometimes by as many as twelve years—the period that 
utilities have to comply.  As shown in Figure 18, eighteen of the twenty-
six amendments that increased RPS targets also enlarged the overall 
compliance period.  Thus, while the amendments that increased RPS targets 
did so by an average of an additional 9.9 percent, the two-thirds of those 
amendments that granted additional time gave, on average, an additional 5.9 
years for utilities to meet these targets.226  This makes sense.  Utilities that 
 
 226. When all of the amendments that increased targets are considered—those that 
granted additional time and those that did not—the average drops to 3.7 additional years 
for compliance. 
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suddenly become subject to more stringent laws will also need more time to 
comply with that heightened target.  But when that additional time for 
compliance is considered in terms of a regulatory race, the amendments start 
to look much less aggressive than they might have seemed at first.  In 
fact, once the additional time that these amendments grant is accounted for, 
the newly heightened RPS targets hardly look more aggressive at all: Prior 
to amendment, the RPSs whose targets were later increased demanded 
a mean of 1.47 percent additional renewables per year.  The amendments 
increased that figure but only mildly so—to 1.74 percent per year, or a 
somewhat meager increase of 0.27 percent per year.  In short, while states 
generally can point to their RPSs being adjusted upward over time, 
this small bump in aspirations should not be credited for demonstrating a 
prevailing race to the top. 
6.  Efficacy Tendency 
Finally, these different metrics of RPS aggressiveness can be measured 
against the laws’ overall policy design—what in a prior article I referred 
to as an RPS’s “efficacy tendency” score.227  While imperfect, this too 
tends to confirm what the other metrics of RPS strictness indicate: that the 
passage of some of these laws might be consistent with a notion of 
increased stringency over time, but overall, the bottom line on state RPSs is 




 227. See Davies, Power Forward, supra note 6, at 1385–86. 
DAVIES - FINAL AUTHOR EDITS ACCEPTED (2) (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/11/2016  9:34 AM 
 
70 


























“Efficacy tendency” scores are available for thirty-five states, and only 
for the versions of those laws that were in effect at the beginning of 
2010.228  Nevertheless, graphing those laws’ efficacy tendency scores 
against the date they were last amended reveals a pattern very much like 
that for RPS speed and load coverage: in short, one of policy divergence 
rather than increased stringency over time.  Efficacy tendency scores 
range from a possible low of zero to a possible high of twenty.229  An RPS 
with a higher score should tend to be more effective—and more 
aggressive—than a law with a significantly lower score.230  Because 
twenty is the maximum score, the expected trend we should see if there 
were an RPS race to the top is an upward sloping line over time that 
plateaus closer to twenty than to zero.  Instead, as plotted in Figure 19, the 
result is a jagged line that bears no apparent relation to time.  RPSs enacted 
 
 228. See id.; see also id. app. E. 
 229. Id. at 1386. 
 230. See id. 
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or last amended in the 1990s might have low scores, or they might have 
high ones.  The same can be said of laws adopted or last amended between 
2005 and 2010.  There is no plain pattern toward additional stringency.  
Eleven states have efficacy tendency scores of fourteen or higher.  Seventeen 
states have scores lower than fourteen. 
By itself, this evidence hardly disproves the suggestion of an RPS race 
to the top.  Efficacy tendency scores merely aim to approximate, not to 
measure, an RPS’s robustness.  Presumably, a more robust RPS should be 
more effective at incentivizing deployment of renewable energy 
installations—of achieving what a racing state wants, namely, more 
business in its geographic boundaries—but there is no definitive verdict 
yet on how RPS design relates to RPS performance.231  Nevertheless, 
when the lack of a clear trend in efficacy tendency scores is taken into 
account together with the other five metrics already discussed, the 
conclusion that emerges becomes even clearer: While there are some 
indications of some states ramping up their renewable energy laws in the 
last two decades, not all states have.  This may mean that some states are 
engaging in a race to the top, but it falls well short of the standard 
necessary to deem a universal regulatory race to the top. 
C.  Implications of the Evidence 
What does it mean that there appears not to be a race to the top in state 
RPSs?  The first question this inquiry begs is whether that conclusion 
computes.  RPSs have become such a dominant force, so quickly, in 
domestic renewable energy law, it seems odd to say that these measures 
do not represent some kind of regulatory race forward.  Certainly, there is 
no denying RPSs’ somewhat surprising emergence in so many states.  The 
data do not refute this.  What the data do show, however, is that the rapid 
emergence of state RPSs does not rise to the level that would be expected 
in order to conclude that they constitute regulatory race to the top.  This 
is not because RPSs are scarce or generally meager.  Rather, it is because 
their adoption is not plentiful enough—a substantial minority of states 
remain holdouts—and because the way they have been adopted is not 
stringent enough—they do not reflect a clear dominant strategy of 
 
 231. As noted previously, most empirical studies of RPSs have eschewed assessing 
the laws’ design in weighing their effectiveness.  Those that have taken policy design into 
account, however, have concluded that design matters.  See supra Part II.B. 
DAVIES - FINAL AUTHOR EDITS ACCEPTED (2) (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/11/2016  9:34 AM 
 
72 
heightened vigorousness over time.  In short, some state enactments may 
be driven by a desire to compete for renewable energy installations, but 
there is enough noise in the data that it would be inappropriate to make a 
universal conclusion that jurisdictional competition is the primary driver 
of RPS enactment and design. 
Indeed, a recent study by Professors Thomas Lyon and Haitao Yin suggests 
that while states clearly sound the bell of economic development when they 
adopt RPSs, this may be more bluster than gust.  In actuality, “states with 
higher unemployment rates”—the very states one would expect to adopt 
RPSs if these laws are truly about economic development —“are less likely 
to adopt an RPS” than their counterparts with lower unemployment 
rates.232  Specifically, the “odds ratio for adopting an RPS decreases 
by 65% if the unemployment rate increases by one standard deviation 
(1.24%), all else equal.”233  From a regulatory race perspective, the 
implications of this finding are crucial.  It means that political symbolism 
may be dominating not only how states write RPSs, but whether they 
adopt them in the first place: Those states that decide to pass the laws 
claim them for all they are worth in presumed economic benefits, but the 
states that need the economic benefits the most are not willing to focus 
their job-seeking resources on adopting RPSs.  Lyon and Yin conclude, 
“state-level job creation is not a driving force for RPS adoption.  On the 
contrary, states with higher unemployment rates may be preoccupied with 
the task of stimulating economic growth, and have little interest in 
considering an RPS—a fundamentally environmental policy tool that 
stands to increase electricity prices.”234 
This view of RPSs is further confirmed by the way states design their 
laws.  The trend in RPS design is diversity, not convergence.  Perhaps this 
should not be surprising.  Because RPSs largely “address global issues of 
sustainability and climate change more than localized pollution 
concerns,” some observers find it “puzzling” that governments, especially 
subnational governments, have “moved suddenly” toward RPSs.235  If it 
is perplexing that there has been sufficient political will to adopt RPSs in 
the first instance, and if it is plain that state politicians use RPSs 
symbolically, it is not a far leap to surmise that there would be political 
differences in how states write their laws. 
To be sure, although the burst of RPS enactments over the last two 
decades is remarkable, there are many reasons why a state might put an 
RPS in place but do so in a way that is not necessarily more aggressive 
 
 232. Lyon & Yin, supra note 75, at 147. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 147–48. 
 235. See id. at 132. 
DAVIES - FINAL AUTHOR EDITS ACCEPTED (2) (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/11/2016  9:34 AM 
[VOL. 3:  3, 2011–12]  State Renewable Portfolio Standards 
 SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY 
LAW  
 73 
than its neighbor’s law.  To begin, simple political differences may explain 
much.236  A state whose politics are not as “green” as its neighbor might 
have sufficient political will to adopt an RPS but not enough to pass the 
most aggressive law.  Lyon and Yin’s study, in fact, suggests that the 
political leanings of a state’s legislature are statistically correlated with 
whether the state will adopt an RPS.  “[T]he percentage of Democrats in 
the state legislature,” they observe, “is an important factor driving RPS 
adoption.”237  “The odds ratio for adopting an RPS increases by just over 
3 times if the percentage of Democrats in the state legislature increases 
by one standard deviation . . . .  This suggests that Democrats, who 
normally have stronger environmental preferences, are significantly more 
favorable towards RPSs than Republicans.”238 
Relying on politics, however, may go only so far.  As Professor Joshua 
Fershee has noted, RPSs are “especially intriguing” from a political 
perspective because “so many states—both ‘red’ and ‘blue’—have adopted 
some form of a mandate.”239  Thus, according to his analysis, “religion is 
a better predictor of an RPS than political party.”240  Nevertheless, given 
that politics appear to have some bearing on whether an RPS is adopted 
at all, it should be self-evident that they also could have an impact on how 
those laws are designed—on a state’s willingness, that is, to ratchet up its 
RPS’s stringency to compete with other states for renewables jobs. 
By the same token, a state rich in solar and wind resources might be 
more willing to enact a thirty percent RPS, when a state with fewer of 
these resources might be willing only to go to fifteen.  Resource disparity also 
may explain some differences in RPS policy.  Professor Fershee’s data 
indicate that, in general, there is a “greater concentration of [states that 
have adopted] RPSs at the top of the scale [of wind capacity] and a lesser 
concentration at the bottom” of that scale.241  That correlation, however, 
does not extend to solar capacity, according to Fershee’s assessment.242  
 
 236. See supra text accompanying notes 174–75.  
 237. Lyon & Yin, supra note 75, at 148. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Joshua P. Fershee, When Prayer Trumps Politics: The Politics and Demographics 
of Renewable Portfolio Standards, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 53, 61 
(2010). 
 240. Id. at 92. 
 241. Id. at 75.  A state’s wind capacity may be especially important because wind 
power traditionally has been the most cost-competitive of renewables.  See infra note 262. 
 242. Id. at 76.  On this point, Lyon and Yin reach a slightly different conclusion:  
“[W]ind and solar potential both exhibit strong impacts on the state decision to adopt an 
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Regardless, what natural resources a state has been endowed with clearly 
has had at least some impact on how states design their RPSs; otherwise 
the prevalence of solar set-asides in these laws, especially among many 
sunny states, would be much harder to explain. 
Likewise, there are reasons why even states that are attempting to use 
their RPSs to compete in a race for industry might not adopt the most 
vigorous law.  A politician in a mildly “green” state that is also down on 
its economic luck might make a rational risk-benefit calculation.  If she 
believes that an RPS will increase the cost of electricity in the state by, 
say, 2¢/kWh, and she thinks that there is only a chance, perhaps 50 
percent, that the law will actually bring industry to the state, she may 
write, or vote for, a law that compromises those two probabilities: an RPS, 
for instance, that only has a 33 percent chance of attracting industry 
because it is less aggressive than the originally proposed measure, but 
that also will only increase prices by 1¢/kWh.  One possible explanation 
of some decisions in regulatory races is the attempt to capture the political 
benefits of taking a position without actually incurring the costs of fully 
investing in that position.243  In the case of RPSs, this might manifest as 
some states passing largely symbolic laws.  Doing so would give 
legislators potential environmental credibility with their constituents244 
but would avoid possible fallout from, for instance, fossil fuel industry 
lobbyists, incumbent utilities opposed to forceful RPSs, or ratepayers who 
do not want their electricity prices to go up. 
This brand of political calculus, moreover, is the very kind of 
reasoning that yield races to the bottom in environmental law.  A 
politician’s desire to signal the state’s willingness to accommodate 
business can lead simultaneously to less environmental protection and no 
real economic benefit.  Given the diversity of stringency in RPSs, this 
same kind of result may be the case for some states’ laws.  If a state’s 
politicians know, for instance, that passage of an RPS is inevitable, they 
may game how it is designed to ensure that it sends the positive “we want 
renewables” political signal, but that it has no real impact on what 
facilities are actually built in the jurisdiction.  If this is the case, the answer 
for why the RPS design data are so noisy may be that there is more than 
one dominant strategy at play: Some states may be racing to the top while 
others are concurrently racing to the bottom. 
Such choices would be entirely consistent with the diversity of laws 
 
RPS. . . .  [S]tates with high wind potential are significantly more likely to adopt an RPS 
than those states with low wind potential. . . .  The estimates also show that states with 
high solar potential are more likely to adopt an RPS compared to those with medium solar 
potential.”  Lyon & Yin, supra note 75, at 148–49. 
 243. See Saleska & Engel, supra note 10, at 78–84. 
 244. See id. 
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now on the books.  Some commentators have suggested that state decisions 
to adopt climate change regulation today may reflect state posturing with 
the federal government to prevent more aggressive federal law later, or to 
ensure an advantageous position if national climate change legislation is 
enacted.245  A state that has already acted can call itself a leader, and thus, 
argue that its own, carefully compromised legislation should be protected 
under federal law.  For RPSs, this might mean that preexisting standards 
would not be preempted by a national RPS, or could be grandfathered 
in.246  If so, this would explain why some RPSs appear stringent on their 
face but underneath are not.  It would be another reason why states might 
adopt RPSs in a political strategy other than a race to the top. 
All this is to say that while there may be much excitement surrounding 
the continued adoption of state RPSs, there are many reasons why that 
apparent legislative enthusiasm might not equate to a regulatory race.  The 
more important question, then, is not whether the absence of an RPS race 
to the top is logical, but rather, what that absence means.  Depending on the 
type, a race to the bottom or the top might suggest the need for federal 
action: a federal floor or a federal ceiling.  But what are the 
implications for the federal-state government divide when the data show 
that there is no clear race to stringency or, perhaps, competing races to 
stringency among some states and races to laxity among others? 
For RPSs, there perhaps is no more important—or timely—question 
than this: Should the broad array of state RPSs become nationalized?  It 
 
 245. See, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: 
The Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 
779–80 (2006) (noting the possibility of state climate change action to preempt “the 
imposition of more rigorous federal controls”); cf. Barry G. Rabe et al., State Competition 
as a Source Driving Climate Change Mitigation, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 3–4 (2005) 
(“The concept of state competition implies that interests other than primarily 
environmental ones also may drive proactive climate change policies.”); Mary Bede 
Russell, Note, What’s It to You?: The Difficulty of Valuing the Benefits of Climate-Change 
Mitigation and the Need for a Public-Goods Test Under Dormant Commerce Clause 
Analysis, 94 IOWA L. REV. 727 (“states anticipate regulation at the federal level and believe 
that starting early will make their transition from fossil fuels more efficient. “). 
 246. Gold & Thakar, supra note 85, at 234 (“State RPS programs often anticipated 
federal RPS requirements that would likely preempt state programs but still provide credit 
for achievements realized at the state level.”); James M. Van Nostrand & Anne Marie 
Hirschberger, Implications of a Federal Renewable Portfolio Standard: Will It Supplement 
or Supplant Existing State Initiatives?, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 853, 874 (2010) (“It is essential 
that a federal RPS not hinder or preempt the substantial progress that states have already 
made in developing and implementing RPS requirements.”). 
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is a longstanding question.  Literally dozens of national RPSs have been 
proposed.247  None has been adopted.  The lack of an RPS race to stringency 
has something to say on this front, at least three things to be precise. 
First, because there is no overarching race to stringency, there should 
not be a need for a federal ceiling that limits state RPS enactments.  If 
states were pushing their RPS standards too far, there would be a risk that this 
kind of regulatory race could lead to an undesirable result.  Instead, the 
lack of a race to stringency implies that states, at most, are adopting laws 
tailored to the political, social, and natural traits of their states.  If we assume 
those political decisions reflect constituents’ political preferences,248 that 
outcome should be economically efficient—or at least not inefficient 
because of wasteful state competition for renewable industry.  The trap of 
a regulatory race should not be skewing the result. 
Second, the lack of an RPS regulatory race lends credence to the 
suggestion that at least some states have adopted these laws for largely 
symbolic purposes.249  If so, this may represent a kind of race within a 
race—a race to laxity for some states while other states race to strictness.  
The presence of a clear race to stringency would have helped refute this 
suggestion.  As it turns out, that evidence is not there.  Certainly, other 
studies showing the sheer diversity of state RPSs already call into question 
whether all RPSs are truly motivated by the desire to foment a renewable 
energy renaissance.  Add to this the increasing variety, and loftiness, of 
goals cited as RPS aims—plus the fact that so many states have adopted 
voluntary RPSs—and there is further support for the proposition. 
Third, the lack of a single RPS race means that there remains room for 
federal action on renewable electricity.  That is, if promoting increased 
renewables is a societal goal, we may need federal action to do it.  The 
hypothesis of an RPS race to the top is that states are stepping into the 
breach to solve the problem of what our generation mix should look 
 
 247. Davies, Power Forward, supra note 6, at 1364–65.  Two recent versions were 
included in the Waxman-Markey bill, the American Clean Energy and Security Act, which 
passed the House of Representatives but not the Senate, and the American Clean Energy 
Leadership Act of 2009.  See also S. 3813, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 248. This is, of course, a somewhat tenuous assumption. 
 249. Cf. Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global 
Commons: The Case of Climate Change, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 219 (2005) (“Strategies 
like renewable portfolio standards have the potential to be much more than mere 
symbolism, and could actually become effective levers for substantially reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions if the renewable portfolio percentage is set high enough.  
However, they are often justified on grounds other than mitigation of climate  
change . . . .”); Robert J. Michaels, National Renewable Portfolio Standard: Smart Policy 
or Misguided Gesture?, 29 ENERGY L.J. 79, 79 (2008) (“The actual record of state [RPS] 
implementations has been largely symbolic.”); Spence, The Political Barriers to a 
National RPS, supra note 171, at 1461 (“Distinguishing the action-forcing RPSs from 
those that represent mere symbolic action is difficult . . . .”). 
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like.250  That, it turns out, is only partially the case.  Most states have acted, 
but many have not.  Additionally, many states are putting more and more 
vigorous laws into place, but again, many are not.  Notwithstanding 
the significant attention they have received, state RPSs reflect a piecemeal 
approach to renewables in the United States, not a holistic solution. 
However, showing that there is not a state-based RPS race to the top 
hardly answers all questions about a possible national RPS, even if it 
indicates that room remains for federal involvement in this sphere.  To 
begin, that there is not an RPS race does not clarify whether we should 
have a national RPS at all.  One might argue, for instance, that the plethora of 
action by some states, and the entrenched inaction by others, indicates that 
our political system has already set the appropriate level of renewables 
needed: If more RPSs were appropriate, more states would act.251  This 
argument can be made irrespective of whether there is a race to the top or 
not: It is that the societal preference for more renewables is not 
sufficient to strengthen these laws, even when the carrot of more industry and 
additional jobs is dangled before decisionmakers. 
Indeed, a national RPS long has faced an uphill battle to adoption.252  
This is both because of its possible costs and because of its  lingering 
political opposition, as Professors Jim Rossi and David Spence have 
lucidly observed.253  In a prior article, I explained why, despite political 
resistance, a federal RPS is preferable to the current status quo of mish-
mashed state requirements.254  Most critically, existing state RPSs have 
erected a fragmented, imperfect market where renewable energy credits 
are not necessarily fungible from one state to the next, and where some 
states flat out ban the use of renewable energy produced in other states for 
satisfaction of their own RPSs.255  Moreover, state RPS design is so 
divergent that some laws come across as mere window-dressing—symbolic 
attempts to gain politicians public favor without really seeking meaningful 
 
 250. See supra text accompanying note 4. 
 251. See supra text accompanying notes 153–57. 
 252. Davies, Power Forward, supra note 6, at 1364–65; see also Mary Ann Ralls, 
Congress Got It Right: There’s No Need To Mandate Renewable Portfolio Standards, 27 
ENERGY L.J. 451, 452 n.11 (2006) (listing prior legislative efforts). 
 253. Rossi, Commentary, supra note 22, at 1433; Jim Rossi, The Shaky Political 
Economy Foundation of a National Renewable Electricity Requirement, 2011 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 361, 366–68 (2011); Spence, The Political Barriers to a National RPS, supra note 
171, at 1464–73. 
 254. Davies, Power Forward, supra note 6, at 1339. 
 255. Id. at 1375. 
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change—while others come with real bite—offering the possibility to 
begin a societal transformation to a more sustainable economy.  A federal 
RPS could help change that. 
Still, measuring a hypothetical federal RPS against the status quo of 
thirty-eight state RPSs addresses only half the equation.  A federal RPS 
would have two primary functions.  First, it would make RECs, and the 
renewable energy they are based on, fungible irrespective of geography 
or political boundary.  This is the efficiency-based “market unification” 
function of a national law.256  Second, a federal RPS would extend the 
requirement that utilities acquire a percentage of their power from 
renewables to utilities that are not subject to that requirement today.  This 
might be referred to as the law’s “renewables promotion” function.257 
It is difficult to quibble with the market unification function of a federal 
RPS.  Given the vast number of laws already on the books, there is little 
reason not to make the operation of these laws more efficient.258 
The renewables promotion function of a federal RPS, however, bears 
closer scrutiny.  Numerous scholars have noted at length the benefits of 
renewables when compared to conventional fuel sources for electrical 
power.259  But a federal RPS also would have costs.  The foremost is the 
increased price of electricity,260 but another is potential inefficacy.  If a 
federal RPS is not supported by needed regulatory complements, such as 
additional transmission capacity, it may not achieve its goals—and so fail 
at a significant cost.261  Likewise, if the law primarily promotes wind, it might 
do little to increase fuel diversity, while concomitantly coming up short 
in helping renewables become more commercially competitive, as wind 
is much farther along in reducing its cost production curve than many 
renewable technologies.262  Also, if a national RPS pushes renewables to 
replace natural gas generation, it could further entrench coal’s position of 
dominance in the nation’s electrical fuel mix, rather than  liberate 
 
 256. Rossi, Commentary, supra note 22, at 1430. 
 257. Rossi refers to this as the “‘mandate’ aspect of the national RPS.”  Id. 
 258. See id. at 1448. 
 259. These include pollution benefits, primarily in the form of lower air emissions; 
climate change benefits, namely in the form of reduced CO2 emissions; security, or 
“independence,” benefits, largely by freeing the nation of its heavy reliance on foreign 
sources of fuel; and sustainability benefits, by shifting away from fuels that are limited to 
those that are perpetually available. 
 260. See Davies, Power Forward, supra note 6, at 1374–75; Rossi, Commentary, 
supra note 22, at 1433; Spence, The Political Barriers to a National RPS, supra note 171, 
at 1457–58. 
 261. Rossi, Commentary, supra note 22, at 1446–48. 
 262. Id. at 1438, 1440.  For a particularly insightful account of how energy regulation 
interfaces with renewable technological innovation, see Joel B. Eisen, The New Energy 
Geopolitics?: China, Renewable Energy, and the “Greentech Race”, 86 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 9 (2011). 
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renewables to compete against that fuel.263  Given coal’s comparatively 
high contribution to greenhouse gas emissions, such an effect would be 
environmentally counterproductive rather than salutary.264 
By definition, whether there is an RPS race to the top does not address 
these thorny questions.  The lack of a race to the top means a national RPS 
ceiling is unnecessary.  It does not, however, mean that an increasingly higher 
national standard is necessary.  That is a question that the lack of a race to 
stringency specifically leaves open: What is socially desirable? 
Ultimately, a more thorough, empirical, value-laden analysis is needed 
to answer that question.265  How best to promote renewables—whether by 
an RPS of one kind or another, by a feed-in tariff, or by a combination of the 
two—is a question of policy design, and of political preferences.266  
Likewise, whether the United States should supply ten, twenty, or fifty 
percent of its electricity from renewal resources by 2020, 2030, or 2050 is 
by definition an inquiry of our societal and economic preferences: how much 
we worry (or do not worry) about environmental externalities, how confident 
we are in existing and pending fossil fuel supplies, and how much we 
prefer current generations to bear costs versus how much we discount costs 
into the future.  It is, in the end, a question of how much we want our society 
to change from what it is today. 
Societal change, especially big change, takes time.  A national RPS, as 
Professor Fershee rightly notes, is at most a “starting point, not an 
ending point.”267  Many other questions about a possible federal RPS need 
to be answered, including where to set the law’s target, and what other 
“help from other energy legislation” a national RPS would need.268  This 
article does not attempt to answer these questions, much less the lofty 
inquiry of what our energy future should be.  Given our nation’s 
increasing trajectory along unsustainable paths, however, the article does 
suggest that there is at least one more reason to consider whether a 
national RPS might be a good place to start. 
 
 263. Rossi, Commentary, supra note 22, at 1438, 1440. 
 264. Id. at 1437. 
 265. But cf. TOMAIN, supra note 196, at 236–38 (criticizing cost-benefit analyses in 
energy planning and arguing that additional reliance on renewables is essential to 
environmental sustainability). 
 266. Cf. Ringel, supra note 32, at 8–10. 
 267. Joshua P. Fershee, Moving Power Forward: Creating a Forward-Looking 
Energy Policy Based on a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1405, 1423 (2010). 
 268. Id. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
State renewable portfolio standards have been held out as comprising 
one of the most prominent examples of a regulatory race to the top—
sometimes to hail state legislative efforts as innovative and forward-
looking, sometimes to suggest that these efforts supplant the need for 
federal law.  The evidence, however, does not support these suppositions.  
What the evidence shows is that state RPSs are at most a partial effort at 
energy law innovation.  States certainly cite economic rationales for 
adopting these laws, a phenomenon fully consistent with the notion of a 
regulatory race.  Some states also have adopted more and more forceful 
RPSs, a fact also supportive of the idea of a race to the top.  Yet a deeper 
analysis of these laws exposes divergence in state efforts, not conformity 
to a dominant strategy that would indicate a singular race to stringency.  
Many RPS enactments, including a number of recent ones, simply do not 
support the idea that states uniformly see these laws as the best way to 
attract the renewable energy industry to their borders.  This has important 
policy implications because it means that there is not a need for a federal 
ceiling on state RPSs.  Even more critically, it means that relying on state 
measures alone is not enough.  Room remains for federal action on 
renewable energy—action that, to date, remains absent. 
 
